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The global financial crisis of 2007 came as a surprise to many academics and scholars 
throughout the world. Unforeseen by many, the crisis sent shockwaves throughout the financial 
world, taking economies hostage as policy makers had little time to prepare or the ability to stop 
them from reaching their shores. Developed country sovereign debt is seen by fixed income 
security investors as “riskless” whereby investors use them to benchmark the returns of any 
added risk other investments may provide. Therefore, it is important for investors to try and 
foresee any potential risks that may arise in the so-called ‘riskless investments’ they invest in.  
This dissertation attempts to answer the following two questions: 1) Was the European 
Central Bank (ECB) able to abate moral hazard when performing a bailout, 2) To which degree 
does trade intra-union versus trade extra-union influence debt yield spreads of Eurozone member 
countries. This dissertation finds that the ECB was generally able to abate the moral hazard when 
performing a bailout. This dissertation also finds that the volatility of terms-of-trade outside the 
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This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Banking and Finance. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The International Fisher Effect maintains that the real interest rate equals the difference 
between the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate (Baumol and Blinder, 1994). This suggests 
that in order to keep the real return the same in every country, nominal interest rates should adjust 
to changes in the inflation rate (Baumol and Blinder, 1994). According to Interest Rate Parity this 
interest rate differential between countries is related to exchange rate differentials between these 
countries (Baumol and Blinder, 1994). Central banks use monetary policy to control the money 
supply in order to adjust exchange rate differentials, thereby influencing interest rates and debt 
yields (Baumol and Blinder, 1994). 
Central banks’ use of monetary policy can be categorized into two distinct policies: 1) 
Expansionary policy, and 2) Contractionary policy (Baumol and Blinder, 1994). Expansionary 
policy is traditionally used during the recessionary phase of business cycles in order to reduce 
unemployment with the intention of reducing the costs of borrowing for businesses, thereby 
encouraging business to expand and hire workers (Baumol and Blinder, 1994).  On rare occasions, 
Expansionary policy could be in the form of bailing out failing banks and financial institutions, 
during times of crisis, by providing liquidity provisions in the form of cash and/or credit in order 
to prevent contagion (Baumol and Blinder, 1994). Contractionary policy is traditionally used 
during the expansionary phase of business cycles in order to slow inflation thereby stabilizing 
prices and asset values (Baumol and Blinder, 1994).  
Expansionary policy essentially increases the money supply thereby decreasing the value of 





currency results in increased prices of real products, for businesses, creating real profits - with 
respect to pre-expansion costs (Baumol and Blinder, 1994). The decrease in the value of the 
currency against other currencies essentially makes products cheaper (with respect to exchange 
rates) (Baumol and Blinder, 1994). Cheaper products promote trade from the country of lower 
value currency to the country of higher value currency, this increase in trade sparks a reversal in 
increasing unemployment (Baumol and Blinder, 1994).  
Currency unions are formed under the intention of reducing the costs of trade and eliminating 
trade barriers between member countries, thereby increasing trade and employment (Rose, 2008). 
The European Union (EU), and in particular the Eurozone, was formed with the objective of 
reducing transaction costs of trade thereby increasing trade and reducing unemployment (Rose, 
2008). As such, EU member countries essentially must agree to loose sovereignty of their currency 
in order to be able to join the union and benefit from this increased trade (Whelan, 2013). Rose 
and Stanley (2005) found an increase of between 30% and 90% in trade between union members. 
The increase in trade has been directly attributed to the reduced transaction costs of trade within 
the currency union that include, but are not limited to, fixed exchange rates and reduced trade 
barriers (Rose, 2000). Because of the loss of sovereignty of their currency, currency unions do not 
have the ability to implement an Expansionary policy in the recessionary phase of business cycles, 
essentially not having the ability to increase trade, and sparking a reversal of increasing 
unemployment (Whelan, 2013). 
Reduction in costs and increases in trade, increases the depth of integration of both real and 
financial markets of union members (Engel and Rose, 2000). Recent studies on economic 
integration and currency unions have found that members of currency unions have more integrated 





(2000) found that currency union members have more trade and less volatility in real exchange 
rates than countries with their own currencies. The reduced cost of trade has effectively reduced 
both welfare costs and dead weight losses, resulting in higher economic welfare for all trading 
parties within the union (Rose, 2008). 
It is well documented that the cost of debt for a country is directly related to macroeconomic 
variables related to that particular country (Keynes, 1936). Higher economic welfare decreases the 
risk of default of debt, thereby increasing the value of sovereign debt to bondholders (Baumol and 
Blinder, 1994). Increasing the value of sovereign debt decreases borrowing costs of a country 
(Baumol and Blinder, 1994). The overall objective of policy makers is to increase economic 
welfare, thereby reassure bondholders that the value of the debt they hold is free of risk of default, 
thereby reducing the cost of borrowing (Baumol and Blinder, 1994).  
Trade is an important macroeconomic variable influencing debt yields and the cost of 
borrowing for countries (Baumol and Blinder, 1994). Trade serves as a mechanism to exchange 
goods and services as well as a means to influence interest rate parity (Baumol and Blinder, 1994). 
Although previous studies have analyzed how trade influences debt yields in individual countries 
with their own central banks, there has not been many studies that focus on how trade influences 
debt yields in currency unions (Baumol and Blinder, 1994).  
During the 2007 sovereign debt crisis in the European Union (EU), the European Central Bank 
(ECB) implemented several fiscal and monetary policies in order to help mitigate the spread of the 
crisis throughout the union (Mink and De Haan, 2013). Some of the policies that the ECB took in 
order to mitigate the spread of the crisis were novel in approach - the likes of which have no 
precedence (Mink and De Haan, 2013). As so, policy makers were forced to make drastic and 





During times of crisis, central banks have traditionally served as Lenders of Last Resort 
(LOLR), where investors have relied on central banks to provide money in order to buy up toxic 
assets to help reduce the shock of the crisis and stop its spread (i.e. bailout) (Whelan, 2013). The 
EU, and more specifically the Eurozone, is composed of several countries that exchange in the 
same currency - the Euro. Each country has the ability to issue their own debt but does not have 
the ability to issue their own currency. The EU operates under the umbrella of the ECB acting as 
a LOLR.  
Upon joining the EU member countries are required to agree to several terms (Wikisource, 
2012). These terms, outlined in the Maastricht Treaty, include several macroeconomic standards 
each member country is required to abide by in order to join and to maintain membership in the 
EU (Wikisource, 2012). One of the clauses that appear in the Maastricht is the “no-bailout clause” 
stipulating that at no point in time, will the ECB act as a LOLR for member countries (Wikisource, 
2012). Since the ECB had a “no-bailout clause” it had no internal procedures in place to perform 
a bailout when needed, and since a bailout in a currency union had never been executed before, it 
had no precedence. 
Several studies document the problems of moral hazard associated with central bank bailouts 
(Cordella and Yeyati, 2003; Dowd, 2009; Eichengreen, 2000; Wikisource, 2012). Moral hazard is 
the predisposition of taking on more risk knowing that, if failed, the burden of this failure will fall 
upon the shoulders of others as well. In terms of the moral hazard of a bailout, if investors believed 
that a bailout would occur, they would seek to take on more risk; thereby increasing potential 
profits with little burden of failure (Hölmstrom, 1979). Moral hazard therefore increases the costs 





LOLR when obligated to, and that they should operate under the need to reduce or eliminate this 
moral hazard if possible (Dowd, 2009). 
One of the important decisions the ECB encountered during the sovereign debt crisis of 2007 
was how to perform and implement a bailout of EU member countries who were at risk of default 
(Collignon, 2012). The challenge that the ECB faced was deciding on whether to take a blanketed 
approach to performing a bailout, where it would bailout all countries at the same time, or to 
perform bailouts to countries one at a time (Collignon, 2012). If they choose a blanketed approach 
to performing a bailout they would reduce increase costs, but if they performed bailouts to 
countries one at a time they would risk a moral hazard (Collignon, 2012). The ECB eventually 
choose to perform the bailouts one at a time in order to reduce costs, but made member countries 
vote on whether or not to perform the bailout. The ECB believed that this voting mechanism would 
decrease the risk of the moral hazard by making investors think twice about whether a bailout 
would be approved or not by member countries. 
1. Problem Statement 
Previous studies that have investigated the influence of trade on sovereign debt yield spreads 
can be categorized into three groups: 1) studies that contend that the use of Expansionary policy 
is important for central banks to influence trade, employment, and thus debt yield spreads 2) 
studies that believe that trade is directly related to the ability of a country to generate dollar revenue 
and therefore influence debt yield spreads, 3) studies that suggest that trade can be a substitute for 
monetary policy. Within the first group, Schuknecht (1996) found that policy makers in less-trade 
intensive countries use expansionary policy in order to increase trade and employment, thereby 
enhancing re-election prospects. However, Schuknecht (1996) adds that immediately after 





Sachs (1984) found that the expansionary policy coordination of individual global economies can 
wreak benefits from “unexploited gains from trade”. Within the second group, Bulow and Rogoff 
(1989) found that changes in a country’s terms-of-trade affects its ability to generate dollar revenue 
from exports and therefore its ability to make payments on its debt. Alternatively, Hilscher and 
Nosbusch (2010) found that volatility of terms-of-trade has a greater effect on debt yields than 
terms-of-trade because investors are more worried about the risk of trade. Within the third group, 
Clarida et al. (2001) simulates the impact of trade and monetary policy on two different economies, 
one open and one closed; their findings suggest that terms-of-trade serves as a macroeconomic 
stabilizer and reduces the intensity of which central banks need to obtain target interest rates. 
Previous studies that have investigated the approach to which bailouts should be performed 
can be categorized into two broad groups: 1) studies that believe central bank bailouts should be 
performed on the aggregate level (Blinder et al., 2008), 2) studies that believe that central bank 
bailouts should be performed on an individual basis (Blinder et al., 2008). Within the first group, 
Huang and Goodhart (1999) argue for performing bailouts in the aggregate, and found that when 
contagion is of concern then moral hazard is an “unpleasant by-product of contagion”, and moral 
hazard becomes less significant. Alternatively, the findings of Ng et al. (2011) suggests that an 
aggregate approach is needed because it is sometimes difficult for central banks to differentiate 
between financial institutions that actually need the bailout and those that do not. Within the second 
group, Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) found that the cost of performing a bailout on the aggregate 
level increases the costs to central banks. Alternatively, Kane and Klingebiel (2004) found that 






This analysis of the current literature suggests the need for further study in the following two 
areas. First, one set of studies related to monetary policy promotes the importance for countries to 
have expansionary policy as a tool to exit the recessionary phase of a business cycle. Another set 
of studies suggest that trade can reduce the need for monetary policy. Yet, another set of studies 
focus on the effect of foreign currency trade on decreasing debt yield spreads. However, since EU 
member countries lack the monetary policy tools, then trade could be looked at as a replacement 
tool for influencing employment and debt yield spreads. This lack of monetary policy facing the 
EU leads to a set of research questions that need to be investigated. Therefore, the first research 
question that needs to be investigated is, to which degree does trade influence debt yield spreads. 
The second question that needs to be investigated is, does the volatility of trade influence debt 
yield spreads. This study aims to address these questions and provides evidence on the 
characteristics of individual currency union members and the influence of trade on debt yield 
spreads. This evidence is critically important to policy makers and investors as it serves as an 
important guide to how trade can be used as a substitute for monetary policy.  
Second, one set of studies related to the approach to which central bank bailout procedures are 
performed maintain that bailout procedures need to be done in the aggregate (Huang and Goodhart, 
1999). Another set of studies suggest that in order to reduce the costs associated with performing 
the bailout in the aggregate, bailouts should be performed on an individual basis (Honohan and 
Klingebiel, 2003; Kane and Klingebiel, 2004). However, opponents to the view that bailouts need 
to be performed on an individual basis argue that this approach increases moral hazard and 
therefore increases the costs of the bailout (Huang and Goodhart, 1999). The objective of the ECB 
was twofold when performing their bailouts, to reduce costs, and to abate the moral hazard. Based 





perform the bailouts on an individual basis (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003; Huang and Goodhart, 
1999; Kane and Klingebiel, 2004; Ng et al., 2011). Choosing the aggregate approach would be too 
costly for the ECB, therefore, they choose to perform the bailout on an individual basis but with a 
specific mechanism outlined in the Maastricht Agreement, with the hopes of reducing the moral 
hazard. This approach to a bailout has no precedence and thus no research as attempted to analyze 
the ability for the ECB to abate the moral hazard when performing a bailout in this manner. 
Therefore, this dissertation will attempt to answer the question: Was the ECB able to abate the 
moral hazard when performing a bailout? This evidence is critically important to policy makers 
and investors as it serves as an important guide to the effectiveness of central banks to reduce a 
moral hazard when bailout procedures are performed on an individual basis.  
2. Organization 
The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 intends to answer the question of whether 
the ECB was able to abate the moral hazard when performing a bailout, Chapter 3 intends to answer 
the question of whether more trade outside the currency union reduces debt yields, and Chapter 4 
is a conclusive summary of the dissertation and provides guidance on the need for further research 










CENTRAL BANK SAFETY NET OPERATIONS AND MORAL HAZARD: AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
1. Introduction 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007 tested policy makers’ ability to halt the crisis and contain 
it from spreading. In order to prevent contagion in their financial crisis, the Federal Reserve of the 
United States took extraordinary steps in providing over 29 trillion dollars in bailing out failing 
banks and other financial institutions (Bloomberg, 2011). To put this bailout amount in 
perspective, the 2005 GDP of the entire world was 31 trillion in 1990 dollars (World Bank, 2012). 
The Federal Reserve took these steps in order to reassure investors, on a practical and 
psychological level, that they have the credibility and the ability to contain this crisis from 
spreading (Enoch, 1997). Therefore, if governments are willing to take such extraordinary actions, 
it is important to analyze ways in which policymakers can take to help reduce these costs. 
During times of crisis, central banks have traditionally served as Lenders of Last Resort 
(LOLR) (Freixas et al., 2004). In serving as LOLR, investors have relied on central banks to 
provide money in order to buy up toxic assets, in order to help reduce the shock of the crisis and 
stop its spread (i.e. bailout) (Whelan, 2013). Recent studies have debated the way in which central 
banks should perform a bailout of banks and the financial system (Blinder et al., 2008). Studies 
that have investigated the approach to which bailouts should be performed can be categorized into 
two broad groups: 1) studies that believe central bank bailouts should be performed on the 
aggregate level (Blinder et al., 2008), 2) studies that believe that central bank bailouts should be 





(1999) argue that moral hazard is an “unpleasant by-product of contagion”, and found that when 
contagion is of concern then moral hazard becomes less significant. Alternatively, the findings of 
Ng et al. (2011) suggests that because it is sometimes difficult for central banks to differentiate 
between financial institutions that actually need the bailout and those that do not, an aggregate 
approach is needed. Within the second group, Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) found that the cost 
of performing a bailout on the aggregate level increases the costs to central banks. Alternatively, 
Kane and Klingebiel (2004) found that “moribund banks” that pose the greatest risk, and therefore 
bailout operations are more efficient when customized to contain them. 
The EU, and more specifically the Eurozone, is composed of several countries that exchange 
in the same currency - the Euro. Each country has the ability to issue their own debt but does not 
have the ability to issue their own currency. The EU operates under the umbrella of the ECB acting 
as a LOLR. Several studies document the problem of moral hazard associated with central bank 
bailouts (Cordella and Yeyati, 2003; Dowd, 2009; Eichengreen, 2000; Kane and Klingebiel, 2004). 
Moral hazard is the predisposition of taking on more risk knowing that, if failed, the burden of this 
failure will fall upon the shoulders of others as well (Enoch, 1997). In terms of the moral hazard 
of a bailout, if investors believed that a bailout would occur, they would seek to take on more risk; 
thereby increasing potential profits with little burden of failure (Hölmstrom, 1979). Moral hazard 
therefore increases the costs of a bailout (Cordella and Yeyati, 2003). Central banks know that 
they will eventually operate as LOLR when obligated to, and that they should operate under the 
need to reduce or eliminate this moral hazard if possible (Dowd, 2009). 
During the 2007 sovereign debt crisis, the ECB implemented several fiscal and monetary 
policies in order to help mitigate the spread of the crisis throughout the union (Mink and De Haan, 





novel in approach - the likes of which have no precedence (Mink and De Haan, 2013). As so, 
policy makers were forced to make drastic and consequential decisions on the fly and had very 
little means to measure the success of these decisions (Pisani‐Ferry and Sapir, 2010). 
Upon joining the EU member countries are required to agree to several terms (Wikisource, 
2012). These terms, outlined in the Maastricht Treaty, include several macroeconomic standards 
each member country is required to abide by in order to join and to maintain membership in the 
EU (Wikisource, 2012). One of the clauses that appear in the Maastricht is the “no-bailout clause” 
stipulating that at no point in time, will the ECB act as a LOLR for member countries (Wikisource, 
2012). Since the ECB had a “no-bailout clause” it had no internal procedures in place to perform 
a bailout when needed, and since a bailout in a currency union had never been executed before, it 
had no precedence (Pisani‐Ferry and Sapir, 2010; Prati and Schinasi, 1998). 
Once the ECB established that a bailout would be the only way to exit the sovereign debt crisis, 
the ECB had to make important decisions of on how to perform and implement a bailout of EU 
member countries who were at risk of default (Collignon, 2012). The challenge that the ECB faced 
was deciding on whether to take an aggregate approach to performing a bailout, where it would 
bailout all countries at the same time, or to perform bailouts to countries one at a time (Collignon, 
2012). If they choose an aggregate approach to performing a bailout they would encounter a 
substantial cost, but if they performed bailouts to countries one at a time they would risk a moral 
hazard (Collignon, 2012). The ECB eventually choose to perform the bailouts one at a time in 
order to reduce costs, but made member countries vote (a mechanism that was already in the 
Maastricht Treaty) on whether or not to perform the bailout (Cantor and Packer, 1996; Pisani‐
Ferry and Sapir, 2010; Prati and Schinasi, 1998). The ECB believed that this voting mechanism 





bailout would be approved or not by member countries (Cantor and Packer, 1996; Pisani‐Ferry 
and Sapir, 2010; Prati and Schinasi, 1998). 
Previous studies have established a significant link between macroeconomic variables and the 
effects of these variables on bond yield spreads (Baumol and Blinder, 1994; Hilscher and 
Nosbusch, 2010). Other studies have found a significant link between monetary policy and the 
effects of monetary policy on bond yields (Baumol and Blinder, 1994). However, the study of 
Hussain (2011) notes that there are issues of measuring the effect of monetary policy on asset 
prices, these issues are the effect of other relevant economic variables on asset prices. Hussain 
(2011) attributes these effects on the use of lower frequency data, therefore, he notes that the use 
of a “high-frequency dataset enables us to separate the effects of monetary policy actions from 
those of other macroeconomic variables…Moreover, the use of such data reduces the problems 
associated with endogeneity and omitted variable bias” (p. 753).  
This chapter intends to measure the ability of the ECB to abate a moral hazard when performing 
a bailout. This chapter applies the technique in which (Brusco and Castiglionesi, 2007) tests for 
the presence of moral hazard, quantitatively by means of Hussain (2011). The results of this 
chapter shows that the ECB was generally able to abate the moral hazard when performing a 
bailout. This finding contributes to the existing literature on central bank bailout procedures, and 
specifically on the effectiveness of a central bank to act as a LOLR under the umbrella of a 
currency union. This finding has important implications for policy makers as well as investors. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the second section, a literature review of 
central banks operations, bailout operations, and the EU/ECB will be discussed. In the third and 





specification is presented. In the fifth and last section, the empirical results of the estimated model, 
discussion of the results, and the conclusion will be presented.  
2. Literature Review 
Balance of Payments Crisis 
In order to better understand why a central bank needs to perform bailouts, it is important to 
understand a balance of payments crisis, therefore, the beginning of this section will discuss this 
in great detail (Jeanne, 2000). For the past three decades, there have been several studies attempting 
to model balance of payments crisis (Corsetti et al., 1998; Flood and Garber, 1984; Jeanne, 2000; 
Krugman, 1979; McKinnon and Pill, 1996; Obstfeld, 1986; Pesenti and Tille, 2000). There have 
emerged three different generations of models, these models have been based on observed crisis 
that have happened (Jeanne, 2000).  
The first generation of models have been modeled by Krugman (1979), and Flood and Garber 
(1984), this generation has been called the “escape-clause model” by Jeanne (2000). Countries 
choose to maintain a fixed exchange rate in order to show credibility and to ward off inflation 
(Jeanne, 2000). The “escape-clause” model was based on the view that a country can only obey a 
fixed-exchange rate arrangement as long as it maintains an equivalent amount of reserves to do so. 
Maintenance of the local currency to a fixed peg is made through the central bank through currency 
sterilization. The action of sterilization involves a central bank offsetting a balance-of-payments 
surplus or deficit by implementing monetary controls such as open market operations, in which 
the central bank artificially intervenes in the depreciation of their currency by selling reserves and 





The sterilization of local currency must be maintained at substantial par in order for the fixed 
exchange regime to maintain legitimacy (Jeanne, 2000). The escape clause term comes from the 
notion that if countries cannot maintain this fixed peg, because the central bank lacks the ability to 
sterilize local currency, they have the option to exercise an escape clause by devaluating, 
revaluating, or floating their currency. The first of two contributions of the “escape clause”, is that 
the escape clause defines fundamentals of country specific characteristics, and has these 
characteristics into two different categories of fundamentals, “hard” and “soft” fundamentals 
(Jeanne, 2000). Hard fundamentals have to do with quantitative fundamentals such as 
unemployment, balance of trade, and other macroeconomic variables. Soft fundamentals deal more 
with qualitative fundamentals such as the reputation, in the eyes of the citizens and investors, of 
central banks to control the value of the currency and to promote economic good.  
The second role of the escape clause led to the second generation of balance of payments crisis 
models in which “self-fulfilling” speculations occur (Obstfeld, 1986). The speculative attack 
involves a run on the reserves of the central bank in which the central bank’s reserves are depleted 
up to the point in which they are forced to devalue, revalue or float their respective currency 
(Obstfeld, 1986). In contrast to the first generation, which is based on a fundamental view of 
macroeconomic influences that lead to balance of payments crisis, the second generation contends 
that although there may exist fundamental anomalies, exchange regimes can still maintain their 
regimes as long as “speculative attackers” do not think that they can pressure the regime to change.  
Self-fulfilling speculators may perform a speculative attacks on the regime whether or not they 
believe they can achieve a successful devaluation of the currency (Obstfeld, 1986). Speculative 
attacks is in one way a win all or loose nothing attempt in forcing a regime to leave the peg and 





first is that a single entity has enough funds to deplete reserves thereby forcing the regime to 
change, or the second, there are enough different speculators involved the sum of which combined 
have enough funds to deplete reserves, thereby also forcing the regime to change. Obstfeld (1986) 
interprets this by means of a game theory, where the attack should be relatively coordinated to the 
point where speculators can gain enough acceleration to drive a momentum in the devaluation and 
force the regime into a floating exchange. 
The third generation of balance of payments crisis models deals with the financial and banking 
sectors, and their roles in a balance of payments crisis. McKinnon and Pill (1996) and Corsetti et 
al. (1998) presents a model in which a “too big to fail” policy will lead to a hidden cost (in the 
form of debt) to governments when governments are forced to bail out companies; this is also 
known as the “Overborrowing Syndrome”.  
Balance of Payments Crisis and Contagion 
Looking at the first generation of balance of payments crisis the effects of contagion on a 
country can be applied (Jeanne, 2000). For example, if a country with a fixed exchange regime is 
forced to expand it’s money supply, the escape clause will eventually take hold, and the country 
will be forced to devaluate. Once devaluation occurs, structural imbalances occur in the balance-
of-payments account, where if the country is dependent on foreign sources for capital, the 
withdrawal of capital from that country can lead to a trade imbalance and eventually the inability 
of a country to repay it’s debt. The contagion occurs when trading partners who rely on a certain 
exchange rate cannot afford to continue trading (Pesenti and Tille, 2000).  
The second generation of balance of payments crisis and contagion occurs on a more 
qualitative level. If monetary authorizes are not seen as credible, and have a “history” of 





devaluation once an economic downturn does occur (Jeanne, 2000). Furthermore, this will reduce 
the value of their investments and, therefore, devaluation will require a higher rate of return for 
investors. When a higher rate of return is required by investors, the countries borrowing costs will 
rise, and when borrowing costs rise, this will reduce credit opportunities and diminish growth 
(Pesenti and Tille, 2000). In this cycle, regimes will eventually fail, and be forced to devaluate and 
abandon the peg.  
The third generation of balance of payments crisis and contagion can be exemplified by the 
Asian crisis (Pesenti and Tille, 2000). The Asian crisis gave us an example of how integrated 
banking and financial sectors become instruments of crisis diffusion in other countries. The 
foundations of the third generation model of balance of payments crisis is if countries’ liabilities 
are denominated in foreign currencies, a sudden appreciation in the foreign currency, will lead to 
a depreciation of the value as expressed in the foreign currency. Balance sheets of the country will 
change, and eventually lead to a balance of payments crisis. 
Currency Unions and Sovereign Debt Crisis 
When countries have integrated trade and financial systems, according to the first-generation 
of balance of payments crisis models, the ability of a country to cover its current account deficits 
by generating sufficient export earnings in the future is a major factor affecting the exchange rate 
regime (Thirlwall, 2003). For example, if a country has a fixed exchange rate, and the reserves are 
not sterilized by the central banks, if a speculative attack occurs on the domestic currency of the 
country, the central bank will have no choice but to devaluate the domestic currency.  
If the central bank devaluates the domestic currency, then this will have an influence on the 
trading partners of that particular country, because it will be more expensive for it’s trading 





contagion happens when investors in the foreign country see that the trading partners have 
devaluated their currency and that the companies that they are invested in the foreign country 
cannot sustain the profits, as a result, they sell the stocks of these companies.  
When investors sell the stocks of these companies, a decrease in the capital account of the 
country will occur, and this will lead to a balance-of-payments imbalance, and therefore lead to a 
monetization of the difference, and then an eventual depreciation (Jeanne, 2000). If countries have 
different currencies and the trade between these countries changes, then a change in the exchange 
rates of these currencies will occure. However, if countries do not have different currencies, and 
the debt of these countries are denominated in the same currency, then interest rate differentials 
between these countries will be purely representative of the risk of default of these countries 
(Baumol and Blinder, 1994).  
Currency Unions and Bailout Operations 
To ward off a speculative attack on the currency in a currency union, then the central bank 
should be seen by investors as credible enough to provide assistance, in the form of a bailout, to 
countries that are in need of this assistance. Based on this, in an integrated financial systems such 
as in the EU, a default of a member state could lead to contagion of the rest of the union. This 
contagion can lead to structural imbalances in the balance-of-payments between the entire union 
and other countries. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the ECB to perform a bailout of all at 
risk countries once a union member is in need of a bailout. 
Current Issues with Bailout of EU by ECB 
Over the past decade there has been a notable increase in the interventions by central banks as 





model the effects of these central bank bailouts (Buiter, 2008; Cordella and Yeyati, 2003; Hakenes 
and Schnabel, 2010; Nier and Baumann, 2006; Okazaki, 2007). Much of the empirical and 
theoretical literatures on central bank bailout operations have found that transparency of bailouts 
ex-ante augment crises by creating a moral hazard (Dowd, 2009; Eichengreen, 2000; Enoch, 1997; 
Mishkin et al., 2006; Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 2001).  Transparency is defined as operating in 
such a way that it is easy for other entities to see what actions are performed. Investors, bank 
managers, bank owners, and depositors may be less prudent if they believe that their banks are 
immune to failure.  
While transparency ex-post may be needed in order to mitigate crises, central bank authorities 
need to show credibility to investors in order to prevent contagion (Enoch, 1997). Transparency 
ex-post is defined as operating in such a way that it is easy for other entities to see what actions 
are performed after an event of interest.  The primary focus of the literature on central bank bailouts 
has been on single countries wherein these central banks operate. The dynamics of transparency 
vs. opacity, with respect to European Central Bank (ECB) bailout policy, has been the focus of 
recent theoretical debate (Blinder et al., 2008). Transparency vs. opacity is defined as operating in 
such a way that it is easy for other entities to see what actions are performed versus not operating 
in such a way that is easy for other entities to see what actions are performed.  Some argue that if 
the ECB commits itself to bail out one troubled country, it should bail out the rest of them at the 
same time (Eichengreen, 2005; Popescu, 2012).   
Other theoretical literature maintains that the bailouts should be performed for specific 
countries in accordance with stringent rules and procedures, not in the aggregate to minimize moral 





receive the bailout, because of required criteria that the country needs to fulfill, they will be prudent 
in investing in that country.  
This paper focuses on the effectiveness of bailout decisions made by the European Central 
Bank (ECB) during a time of sovereign debt crises, on a specific country. In particular, this chapter 
seeks to find whether bailout decisions/statements made by the ECB, during times of crisis for a 
specific country, affect other countries within the ECB. Times of crisis refers to a situation in 
which countries presently, or in the near future need help from a LOLR to service their debt 
obligations.  Given that the ECB bailed out one country at a time, was the ECB able to abate the 
moral hazard? On June 17, 2013, Ed Yardeni, president and chief investment strategist at Yardeni 
Research Inc. stated, “The purpose of central-bank transparency was to give markets clarity and 
reduce volatility” (as cited in Kennedy and Miller, 2013). 
 The debate in the literature over central bank bailout operations has been fraught with irony. 
One side of the literature argues that central banks need to have an agreed upon set of procedures 
to follow as to assist in effectively executing the bailouts (Calomiris, 1997; Mussa and Savastano, 
2000; Popescu, 2012). The other side of the literature argues that one reason why a central bank 
exists is to prevent a crisis from happening in the first place; therefore, how can there be procedures 
for an event that ‘will’, or rather ‘should’, not happen in the first place. However, if procedures 
are in place for central banks to follow in a crisis, then a role of central banks is to assist in coping 
with the crisis once it occurs, suggesting that a crisis will occur. If investors believed that an 
eventual crisis and subsequent bailout would occur, consistently with existing protocols, they 
would seek to force banks to take on more risk; thereby increasing potential profits with immunity 





certain about what actions central banks will take if any, or how effective these actions would be 
– thus exacerbating the crises.  
Some studies argues that central banks should have a set of internal bailout steps that should 
not be revealed to the public until they are put to action (Calomiris, 1997; Mussa and Savastano, 
2000; Popescu, 2012). Opponents to this view believe that although it might be beneficial to have 
a set of clandestine bailout procedures, it will only be effective the first time a bailout takes place. 
Therefore, investors know what the central bank will do, based on experiences in past crises.  
The concept of ‘investor learning’ has been the subject of recent literature, where it has been 
formalized as the investors’ ‘adaptive learning of rational expectations’ (Bernanke, 2004; Branch 
et al., 2013). As central banks set their long-term goals, market participants use adaptive learning 
tactics in the short-term to align (fine tune) themselves with the rational expectations (given 
changes in the economy) of the central banks’ long-term goals (Bernanke, 2004; Branch et al., 
2013). Orphanides and Williams (2004) and Geraats (2002) demonstrate inflation dynamics as an 
equation that describes interest rate fluctuations that are known by investors within a certain 
statistical boundary parameters set by the central bank. Investors use this equation to estimate the 
unknown future fluctuations of rates based on objectives of the central bank.   
However, some studies found that these unknown objectives are both essential and detrimental 
(Enoch, 1997; Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 2001). These changes function to offset the adaptive 
learning of rational expectations, but the unknown objectives can lead to instability (Bernanke, 
2004; Branch et al., 2013; Eusepi and Preston, 2007). Bernanke (2004) lends to the argument that 
central banks need to constantly change the way in which they operate in order to offset the 
adaptive learning of interest rate and, as cited in Blinder et al. (2008), writes: “Specifying a 





circumstances, is impractical. The problem is that the number of contingencies to which policy 
might respond is effectively infinite (and, indeed, many are unforeseeable).” Although investors 
might learn from the past, central banks have an infinite number of tools. This makes it relatively 
difficult for investors to foresee the steps that a central bank may use to resolve a crisis.  
During bailouts, it is important for central banks to maintain transparency in terms of their 
monetary policy. Central banks create moral hazard by being transparent about bailouts ex-ante, 
but must be transparent ex-post in order to mitigate the crisis (Enoch, 1997). Investors guess which 
firms are “too-big-to-fail”, however, there always exists the risk that the central bank will not bail 
out a particular firm. This risk serves as a safety barrier for central banks against investors’ moral 
hazard. As with the Troubled Asset Relief Plan (TARP) that the Federal Reserve (Fed) used to bail 
out failing banks in 2007, the Fed forced banks to take TARP funds even when the banks did not 
need the money. The reasons why banks were forced to take TARP, as noted in the literature, 
ranged from not letting the banks that really needed TARP to stand out, causing depositors to 
panic, to the Fed not knowing the exact financial position of the bank (bad accounting practices) 
in addition blanketing all banks with the cash.  
In a bailout of the financial sector of EU countries by the ECB, the sovereign debt failure of a 
member state would aggravate the crisis. The mere existence of the union would be compromised. 
It would not be surprising that investors believe that the ECB would not be reluctant to bail out a 
country if needed. Furthermore, the financial position of some of the troubled EU countries were 
a mystery; Featherstone (2011) noted that “…the credibility of the Greek data became a major 
issue for the international financial markets…EUROSTAT reported that the Greek data could not 
be relied upon: it had reason to question their accuracy five times during 2005–09. Even the new 





as a ‘joke.’” Therefore, there lies difficulty for the ECB to assess whether a country needs to be 
bailed out or not since the finances of these respective countries were poorly accounted for , if not 
intentionally, so that responding to the crisis as the Fed did in the U.S. would produce a positive 
effect. Some literature suggest that an approach to bailing out individual countries by assessing 
the individual needs of that country and requiring austerity reduces moral hazard (Cordella and 
Yeyati, 2003; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Eichengreen, 2000; Nier and Baumann, 2006). Other 
literature argues that it was inevitable that countries would receive a bailout - even if the country 
did not agree to austerity measures - because the failure of one country would pose a systemic risk 
to the EU (Mussa and Savastano, 2000; Popescu, 2012). 
Upon joining the EU, all countries must act in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty. The 
treaty declares that no country will be bailed out; decisions made by the ECB must be voted upon 
by all member countries, and passed in unanimity. Literature on the ECBs bailout operations of 
the financial sector in member states during the 2007 Sovereign Debt Crisis have alluded to the 
fact that because of these clauses, the market was uncertain of whether the bailout of a member 
country would take place (Featherstone, 2011; Mink and De Haan, 2013). The intention of the 
clause in the Maastricht was to pressure governments to make disciplined fiscal decisions, at the 
same time preventing moral hazard by investors. However, Attinasi et al. (2010) found that there 
was no significant correlation between sovereign bond spreads and the size of the bailouts during 
the 2007 EU Sovereign Debt Crisis. They interpret this as suggestive of market conviction that the 
ECB would “provide as much support as needed to shore up ailing banks regardless…”. This 
finding suggests that investors believed that the ECB would do whatever was needed to support 
troubled EU countries, regardless of the clause in the Maastricht, and that a blanketed approach to 





The EU presents a unique opportunity to assess the effectiveness of bailout operations on a 
number of sovereign countries under the umbrella of a single central bank. Because of the 
Maastricht treaty the ECB has never previously considered a bailout. On the contrary, the 
governing structure of the ECB obligates approval by all member states in order for the bailout to 
take place. The ECB had no precedents to follow and therefore had to formulate a new bailout 
package that all member states agree upon. Given these circumstances, it would have been difficult 
for the ECB to establish a blanketed bailout operation as the Fed did with TARP. The only feasible 
option that the ECB had on the table was to systematically bail out individual countries and as a 
consequence gaining the approval of individual EU countries along the way. The approach that the 
EU took was to bail out individual countries and impose fiscal austerity as preconditions for the 
bailout. Given that the ECB was bailing one individual country at a time, was the ECB able to 
abate the moral hazard? 
On one side of the extreme, if the ECB bails out one country at a time, and investors are 
absolutely confident that a bailout will occur, then investors would not sell the sovereign debt of 
other failing countries knowing that the ECB will eventually bail them out. In contrast, if the ECB 
bails out one country at a time, and if investors are absolutely confident that a bailout will not 
occur, they will have been prudent enough to sell the sovereign debt of the failing countries 
knowing that their investments were insolvent. In both extremes, highly efficient markets are seen; 
one with an extreme moral hazard, and the other - a total antithesis. However, if the ECB shows 
that it intends to bail out one country at a time, and does so without issue, then investors will buy 
troubled country sovereign debt, betting that a bail out will be coming soon. Looking at the actual 





enough to abate the crisis. Simultaneously, this objective is drawn between trying to reduce costs 
of performing a bailout in the aggregate, and reducing moral hazard.  
This chapter will attempt to measure the ability of the ECB to abate the moral hazard associated 
with the bailouts of troubled EU countries. This chapter will focus on the bailout measures 
executed by the ECB for one of the troubled EU countries, and see the volatility responses of the 
other countries. As a proxy to measuring moral hazard, this chapter will measure the real volatility 
of sovereign debt yields of troubled EU countries. This chapter will see the change in volatility the 
day before and the day after bailout measures are announced – benchmarked on days with no 
announcements.  
With respect to monetary policy, given the efficiency of markets, asset prices in strong-form 
efficient markets “reflect even hidden or insider information”, where with proper guidance by 
policy makers, market participants should price in expectations of the future (Fama, 1965). Interest 
rate fluctuations due to monetary policy are a direct result of a “response to the ‘surprise’ 
component” of policy makers’ changes; where given market expectations of a change to the target 
interest rates, when the changes actually occurred, expected changes showed less of a response in 
interest rate fluctuations than “surprise” changes.  
When unexpected changes in monetary policy occur, interest rates therefore become more 
volatile; this change in volatility reveals information about the expectations of investors and a their 
ability to price-in asset prices (Kuttner, 2001). In terms of bailouts, if sovereign debt investors are 
uncertain of whether or not a bailout will occur, then the market is not efficient, and therefore this 
chapter would see a volatility increase in response to ‘new’ information - when revealed. 





was a relative surprise to the market, thus the ECB has effectively reduced the moral hazard of 
bailing out individual countries.  
It is important to note that central bank bailouts traditionally take on two general forms; a 
bailout of the financial sector and/or a bailout of sovereign debt (by restituting creditors). During 
the EU Sovereign Debt crisis, the ECB and IMF organized a series of what they referred to as 
“rescue packages,” which are combinations of both sovereign debt and financial sector [bank] 
bailouts. The rescue packages were designed to support failing banks to prevent a bank run. These 
rescue packages were also intended to support debt yields by repaying maturing government bonds 
instead of just letting the creditors bear the risk and incentivizing creditors to "haircut". 
3. Methodology 
As utilized in (Hussain, 2011), this chapter utilizes high-frequency data to measure moral 
hazard. Therefore, it is important to control for volatility, as to verify that the volatility measure of 
moral hazard is not coming from any other relevant piece of information. The use of high-
frequency data separates the effect of monetary policy actions from those of macroeconomic news 
announcements on the volatility, and it also reduces problems associated with endogeneity and 
omitted variable bias in econometric estimation (Hussain, 2011).  
However, Harju and Hussain (2011) found that certain macroeconomic news in the U.S. might 
impact the stock market in certain European Countries, therefore, this chapter followed the 
procedure outlined by Campbell (2007) by using the Survey of Current Business website published 
by the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis to identify if any macroeconomic news might 
increase/decrease volatility in the countries of interest. It was found that there were three key 
macroeconomic news pieces that were released by the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis: 





Balance [March 9, 2012]. From these three key macroeconomic news releases, the only significant 
news release that effected the countries used in this research was the March 9, 2012 Trade Balance 
news that effected the German market – which is not one of the countries of interest.  
Although the use of high-frequency data used in this chapter controls for macroeconomic news 
announcements, endogeneity, and omitted variable bias as noted in Hussain (2011) the sample 
followed the procedures set out by Bilal et al. (2012) by using the Trading Economics 
macroeconomic database website to identify any macroeconomic news releases in the EU that 
might influence debt yields. Based on the database, because of the 42 trading day data sampling 
span of the chapter, it was found that there was no macroeconomic news released for the countries 
of interest on days of interest.  
In yet an additional step in controlling for volatility the chapter benchmarked Germany’s 
volatility as an additional step in verifying that the volatility of the countries of interest was not 
affected by any other news, the results show that the volatility of Germany remained unchanged 
even with the Trade Balance release from the U.S. news on one of the days of interest. Brand et 
al. (2010) found that the ECB has a practice of announcing that a monetary policy decision will be 
made on a certain day in the future, but if, on the day of the actual announcement, expectations 
were different from the actual policy announcement, they found that this differential lead to 
significant increases in debt yield volatility. 
Therefore, although the announcement of the voting of a bailout was known by the public, an 
increase in volatility would indicate that the news that was actually released was unexpected by 
investors. Furthermore, Chordia et al. (2005) model liquidity co-movements across different asset 





monetary policy drive the stock market. This finding indicates that during financial crisis, bailout 
announcements drive the stock market. 
This chapter intends to measure the ability of the ECB to abate a moral hazard when performing 
a bailout. This chapter utilizes the measures in which Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007) tests for the 
presence of moral hazard, quantitatively by means of Hussain (2011). This chapter also uses the 
spot volatility measurement models specifically for high-frequency data noted in Fan and Wang 
(2008). 
Analysis of the data for detecting increases in volatility during days of no events, the same day 
of an event happening, and days after an event has happened is modeled in the following equations; 
Equation 1 through Equation 6 below (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1997; Hussain, 2011).  
Equation 1 
No Event with full 120 observations per trading day. 
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Same day of Event with full 120 observations per trading day. 
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Day after Event with full 120 observations per trading day. 
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No Event with first 5 of 120 observations removed per trading day. 
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Same day of Event with first 5 of 120 observations removed per trading day. 
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Equation 6 
Day after Event with first 5 of 120 observations removed per trading day. 
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The left hand side variables|∆𝑦|, |∆𝑦|̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , and |∆𝑦|̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿  are the absolute value of the changes in yield 
from (5 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡) − (5 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1) and are the spot volatility 
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))𝑄𝑞=1  is a Flexible 
Fourier Form of one day for both the full 120 observations per trading day and the first 5 of 120 
observations removed per trading day as presented by Gallant (1981), and applied by Andersen 
and Bollerslev (1997) and Hussain (2011) (Fan and Wang, 2008).  
In addition to the method of analysis above, in order to offset any outlier bias in the regression 
estimation because of mismatching observation sizes, the mean of each observation with respect 
to each 5-minute time spot in the dataset for the three event highlighted subsets for both dependent 
and independent variables (the second methodology is cited below) were taken. Analysis of the 
data for detecting increases in volatility during days of no events, the same day of an event 
happening, and days after an event has happened using the conditional mean spot volatility is 
modeled in the following equations; Equation 7 through Equation 12 below (Andersen and 
Bollerslev, 1997; Fan and Wang, 2008; Hussain, 2011). The nature of the Flexible Fourier Form 
is a repeating integrated Sin/Cos cycle that repeats infinitely. The Flexible Fourier Form of these 
models was composed of a parameterized quadratic component fitted on the mean of each 5-minute 
spot of everyday of the entire data set for the respective countries. This methodology incorporates, 
in essence, the method presented by Gallant (1981), and applied by Andersen and Bollerslev 
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  are 
the conditional means of the absolute value of the changes in yield from (5 −
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡) − (5 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1) and are the conditional spot volatility 













parameterized quadratic component of the Flexible Fourier Form of one day for both the full 120 
observations per trading day and the first 5 of 120 observations removed per trading day without 
the infinity repeating functional forms, ∑ (𝛿𝑞 cos (
𝑞2𝜋𝑡
120
) + 𝜑𝑞 sin (
𝑞2𝜋𝑡
120
))𝑄𝑞=1 , and 
∑ (𝛿𝑞 cos (
𝑞2𝜋𝑡
115
) + 𝜑𝑞 sin (
𝑞2𝜋𝑡
115
))𝑄𝑞=1  (Fan and Wang, 2008). The analysis will be performed 
using Ordinary Least Squares regression, and proper regression diagnostics will be performed for 
the data set as needed.  
Taking a closer look at the regression, the Flexible Fourier Form is used as an independent 
variable to offset the seasonality of the intraday fluctuation in the conditional volatility of the data, 
the seasonality in the regression constitutes the “normal” volatility that is used as a benchmark 
against our event days – our days of interest (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1997; Andersen et al., 
2003; Hussain, 2011). A significant FFF variable for each regression would signify a successfully 
adjustment of the regression for the intraday conditional volatility per that given time series model. 
Regressing the spot volatility (|∆𝑦|, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡−1|) on the seasonally adjusted intraday 





captured by the model (Andersen et al., 2003; Hussain, 2011). This dispersion constitutes increases 
and decreases in the volatility and intensity of the volatility of the event days, by which uncertainty 
about bailout expectations can be measured. The results of the regression model will give us the 
following information: the Sum of Squared Residuals due to the regression (𝑆𝑆𝑅 =  ∑(𝑦?̂? − ?̅?)
2), 
the Total Sum of Squares (𝑆𝑆𝑇 =  𝑆𝑆𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆𝐸 = ∑(𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?)
2 + ∑(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦?̂?)
2), and the resultant 
Coefficient of Determination ( 𝑅2 =
𝑆𝑆𝑅
𝑆𝑆𝑇
); the lower the analogous dispersion between the 
volatility modeled by the FFF and the spot volatility – the higher the SSE – the lower the 𝑅2. 
Therefore, if there is an increase in the beta coefficient on days of no announcements vs days of 
announcements, this can be interpreted as the ability for policy makers to increase uncertainty 
about a bailout – abating moral hazard. 
To test this, tick data from Bloomberg for selected European countries was taken and applied 
using a 5-minute sampling for the selected countries. In order to offset any issues with regime 
changes, as discussed in Hussain (2011), observations were limited to approximately 42 trading 
days in which several important events occurred. The focus would be on four events that are 
defined as “Key Dates of the financial crisis (since 2005)” by the ECB on their website. Data 
would be sampled from February 13, 2012 to March 13, 2012. February 12, 2012 was removed 
from the sample because of a shortened trading day. The trading day ran from 1:00AM GMT to 
11:00AM GMT for all time periods except for Germany which in the second half of the time period 
was offset by one hour (starting at 2:00AM GMT), but the overall data consisted of 120 5-Minute 
intervals in which the data was sampled. This sampling frequency is high enough to satisfy the 
Nyquist Sampling Frequency Criterion (Nyquist, 1928). A description of the full data set pulled 
from Bloomberg is listed in Table 6. I filtered/extracted the 5-minute yield at every five minute 





the yield from the previously recorded yield, therefore, in order hold consistency for analysis, any 
missing 5-minute yield was replaced with the previously recorded 5-minute yield. If yields were 
missing in the first time slots, then the first recorded spot yield that day was copied upwards to fill 
every 5-minute yield gap until the first time slot. The spot volatility measure in this chapter, is the 
spot volatility calculated based on 5 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 − 5 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1, 
formally modeled in Fan and Wang (2008). The first recorded yield in the entire set was set to 0, 
and every subsequent first recorded daily 5-minute change in yield was based on the change of the 
first recorded 5-minute yield of the given day subtracted from the last recorded 5-minute yield 
from the previous day. 
Before beginning the analysis, the raw data extracted from Bloomberg was filtered and 
categorized into three categories: days of no event(s) unless the day after an announcement, Days 
of which an event(s) happened, and days after which an event(s) happened. The filtering was done 
for the specific countries and a descriptive statistics of the data is listed in the following tables; 
Table 7, Table 8, Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11. As discussed in Andersen et al. (2003), Andersen 
and Bollerslev (1997), and Hussain (2011), their analysis removed the first few 5-minute 
observations citing noise made by the start of trading. However, this noise might be informative, 
therefore, an analysis with both the full 120 5-minute observations as well as an analysis with the 
five first 5-minute observations removed would be performed.  
4. Data 
This chapter specifically seeks to find how bailout decisions/statements made by the ECB, 
during times of crisis for Greece, affected other countries within the ECB, and whether the ECB 
was able to abate the moral hazard. The ECB bailout was publicized (what was published was the 





up to the trading day the decisions/statements made but were made after markets closed. Since the 
Maastricht had a “no bailout” clause, an initial bailout would have come as a surprise to the market. 
However, if there were a set of clandestine bailout operations, it will only be effective the first 
time a bailout takes place, because investors know what the central bank will do, based on 
experiences in past crises or previous bailouts. Since the ECB did perform and reveal bailout 
operations, then the question of whether a bailout would occur or not was irrelevant. This chapter 
will perform the analysis on the second bailout package that the ECB performed for Greece to see 
if the approach the ECB took helped abate the moral hazard for the second and possibly future 
bailouts.  
This chapter models the intraday volatility of sovereign debt yields of four troubled European 
Union (EU) countries; Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain, to see if the sovereign debt markets are 
affected by ECB statements on bailout decisions during a specific period during the 2007 Financial 
Crises for Greece. The countries of interest were chosen based on the study by Gärtner et al. (2011), 
and the country of Italy was added because of similar default risk based on the yield spreads. 
Cyprus was not used in the study because the Cyprus government would cut off trading once debt 
yields passed a threshold level, therefore, this would bias the results. Slovenia was removed 
because of a lack of data to run the analysis. This chapter does not include Ireland because the 
Irish government announced that it would guarantee deposits in all of its six largest banks (Acharya 
and Steffen, 2012; Attinasi et al., 2010). The resulting choice of countries resulted in a final country 
choice of Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain.  
Volatility of an assets return, as noted in the literature, represents the amount of uncertainty of 
that underlying asset (Campbell, 1997; Glosten et al., 1993; Nelson, 1991). This chapter will proxy 





The focus will be on two distinct event days, and non-event days – the trading days the bailout 
decisions/statements were made, the trading days after the ECB decisions/statements were made, 
and non-event days. The focus will be on four decisions/announcements pertaining to the second 
Greek bail out (1) “Eurogroup agrees to second financial aid package for Greece” [February 21, 
2012] (2) “ECB temporarily suspends eligibility of Greek bonds as collateral” [February 28, 2012] 
(3) “ECB allots €530 billion to 800 banks in second 36-month longer-term refinancing operation” 
and “European leaders sign fiscal compact” and “Eurogroup activates Eurosystem collateral 
enhancement scheme” [March 1, 2012] (4) “ECB reactivates eligibility of Greek bonds as 
collateral” [March 8, 2012].  
This chapter is interested in modeling the volatility with respect to event days surrounding the 
four decisions/announcements made for Greece. This chapter first benchmarks volatility by 
deriving “normal” volatility by modeling the volatility of the entire data set. The chapter will 
follow the procedure for obtaining “normal” volatility by modeling the volatility of the entire data 
set as set forth by Hussain (2011) and Andersen and Bollerslev (1997). This research then 
measured the volatility of the days of interest – days of no-announcement, days before 
announcement, and days after announcement. This chapter will then use the benchmarked 
“normal” volatility to compare to the event days. This increase in volatility indicates that investors 
are uncertain that the bailout will be approved.  Since bailouts must be voted upon, and therefore 
the voting outcome is uncertain, it should be expected that on the day that the decision/statement 
is announced, the volatility for other at-risk countries will increase with respect to average 
volatility (days of no announcements). If investors are certain the ECB will bail out a country, after 
the bailout is decided/announced, the volatility for other at-risk countries will decrease with respect 





volatility before and after the bailout is decided/announced for other at-risk countries should be 
observed. [Refer to Table 1 and Table 2] 
Table 1: Bailout Matrix I 
Bailout Matrix I. 
 No Increase in Volatility 
with respect to no-
announcement days 
Increase in Volatility with 
respect to no-
announcement days 
Trading Day Before 






Table 2: Bailout Matrix II 
Bailout Matrix II. 
 
5. Results 
The regression analysis results of both methodologies are discussed in this section. To 
exemplify the ‘degree of fit’ that the FFF has on the data, the following figures are shown in the 
appendix: Figure 2 through Figure 21 (in the Appendix). The first set of regression results (Table 
12 through Table 16) represent the change in volatility given the conditional mean for each country 
using both average 120 and 115 5-minute day samplings. A highly significant dependent variable 
(two event and one non-event) indicates that the Flexible Fourier Form representing the “normal” 
intra-day volatility, conditional on the time of day, conforms to the intra-day volatility of the event 
days. An increase in volatility is signified by an increase in the coefficient of the FFF, and a 
decrease signifies the opposite. 
 No Increase in Volatility 
with respect to no-
announcement days 
Increase in Volatility with 
respect to no-
announcement days 
Trading Day After 
Announcement of Bailout 





In Table 12, the Spain 10 Year bond yields for both the average 120 and 115 5-minute day 
samplings are displayed. In Table 13, the Portugal 10 Year bond yields for both the average 120 
and 115 5-Minute day samplings are displayed. In Table 14, the Italy 10 Year bond yields for both 
the average 120 and 115 5-minute day samplings are displayed. In Table 15, the Greece 10 Year 
bond yields for both the average 120 and 115 5-minute day samplings are displayed. In Table 16, 
the Germany 10 Year bond yields for both the average 120 and 115 5-minute day samplings are 
displayed. In Table 17, the Spain 10 Year bond yields for both the 120 and 115 5-minute day 
samplings are displayed. In Table 18, the Portugal 10 Year bond yields for both the 120 and one 
hundred fifteen five-Minute day samplings are displayed. In Table 19, the Italy 10 Year bond 
yields for both the 120 and 115 five-Minute day samplings are displayed. In Table 20, the Greece 
10 Year bond yields for both the 120 and 115 five-Minute day samplings are displayed. In Table 
21, the German 10 Year bond yields for both the 120 and 115 five-Minute day samplings are 
displayed. [all in the Appendix] 
Looking at the regression results, based on the p-values of the regressions, the Flexible Fourier 
Form representing the “normal” intra-day volatility of the model fit extremely well and conforms 
to the intra-day volatility of the event days. The p-values on the German Flexible Fourier Form 
115 5-minute sampling conditional mean spot volatility were significant. In respects of interpreting 
the results, the full 115 day observation conditional mean spot volatility calculations (Equation 10 
– Equation 12) without the repeating component of the FFF will be used. A decrease or increase 
in the independent coefficient of a model would reveal to us a decrease or an increase in volatility 





Table 3: Summary of Results for Conditional Mean Spot Volatility with 115 5-Minute Interval 
Observations 
Summary of Results for Conditional Mean Spot Volatility with 115 5-Minute Interval 
Observations 
Summary of Results for Conditional Mean Spot Volatility with 115 5-Minute Interval 
Observations 
 Trading Day Before 
Decision/Announcement 
Trading Day After 
Decision/Announcement 
Spain Increase in Volatility No Increase or Decrease in 
Volatility 
Portugal Increase in Volatility* No Increase or Decrease in 
Volatility* 
Italy Increase in Volatility No Increase or Decrease in 
Volatility 
Greece Decrease in Volatility* Decrease in Volatility 
Germany No Increase or Decrease in 
Volatility 
No increase or Decrease in 
Volatility 
*FFF not statistically significant at the p<0.1 
6. Conclusion 
The results are summarized in Table 3. Overall, the results show an increase in the volatility 
for all troubled countries except Greece. The statistical significance for the benchmark FFF for the 
model is extremely weak on both days of interest for Portugal and one day of interest for Greece. 
The weak results for Portugal may be because trading for Portugal debt was somewhat sporadic. 
The highest R-squared for Portugal was a little less than 0.048; this further indicates that trading 
might have been too sporadic to sample the data at high frequency for the days of interest. As for 
Spain, the results revealed an increase in volatility for the trading day before the announcement. 
As for Italy, the revealed an increase in volatility for the trading day before the announcement. 
The benchmark country Germany had consistent results as expected and no significant increase or 
decrease in volatility the day before or after an announcement. As for Greece, there was an 
interesting finding. There was a decrease in the volatility the trading day before the 





the FFF on the day before the announcement was not significant. Overall, with the exception of 
Greece, the results indicate that the ECB was taking the necessary steps in performing the bailouts, 







THE EFFECTS OF TRADE ON SOVEREIGN DEBT IN A CURRENCY UNION 
1. Introduction 
Over the past decade there has been a notable increase in studies discussing the sustainability 
of currency unions (Casella, 1992; Cohen, 1993; Wilkinson, 1997; Wyplosz, 1991). Many of these 
studies have emerged to model the interrelationships between union members, in terms of 
economic integration and trade. Many of these studies found that currency unions decrease 
transaction costs; thereby, promoting trade and economic welfare. Yet other studies found that 
during times of crisis the inability to use monetary policy bodes dire for union members (Benigno, 
2004; Lane, 2000; Rose and Van Wincoop, 2001).  
While currency unions decrease transaction costs and promote trade, these can cause problems 
stemming from asymmetric shocks in terms of business cycles and nominal rigidities that are 
responsible for these business cycles. Most studies agree that although asymmetric shocks and 
nominal rigidities are problematic for currency unions, there exist macroeconomic stabilizers such 
as fiscal policies that serve to dampen these problems. Fiscal policy serves to counter-business 
cycles inherent in open capital markets (Benigno, 2004; Lane, 2000; Rose and Van Wincoop, 
2001). 
Other theoretical studies maintain that although fiscal policies alleviate problems of different 
business cycles, lower transaction costs of trade ultimately shoulder the asymmetries in business 
cycles. These studies found that there is a strong positive correlation between increased trade and 
co-movements in prices as well as business cycle synchronization (Beetsma and Jensen, 2004; 





Some studies maintain that the benefits received intra-union by members, such as capital 
mobility and stable exchange rates, outweigh the loss of monetary policy independence. Although 
existing studies discuss the internal benefits of currency unions, through synchronization of 
business cycles, these studies fail to discuss the counter-cyclicality of the union as a whole with 
other extra-union countries (Rose, 2008). 
This chapter focuses on the problems associated with the dependency on greater intra-union 
trade. In particular, if some union members have greater extra-union than intra-union trade, then 
nominal rigidities become significant and real shocks drive business cycles between these 
members and extra-union members. Countries that have more intra-union than extra-union trade, 
will suffer more during these business cycle shocks unless labor is mobile. If some countries in 
the currency union have more intra-union than extra-union trade, then the idea of labor mobility 
as noted by Mundell (1961), although widely dismissed as insignificant, may be an important 
adjustment mechanism.  
This chapter extends the model of Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) by taking two key 
macroeconomic fundamental variables (terms-of-trade, and volatility of terms-of-trade) and 
differentiating between trade intra-union and extra-union. Investors, in particular bondholders, 
care as much about the shock to the terms-of-trade (volatility of terms-of-trade) as they do about 
the actual terms-of-trade itself. Investors care that the risk of an adverse shock, represented by the 
volatility of terms-of-trade, might affect the terms-of-trade in the future. The macroeconomic 
variables directly related to a countries’ ability to service its debt obligations (the volatility of 
terms-of-trade extra-union) would have a significant impact on terms of trade. Therefore, this 
chapter hypothesizes that an increase in the volatility in the extra-union terms-of-trade will 





This chapter found that a 1 percentage point increase in the volatility of terms-of-trade outside 
the union is associated with a 0.23 percentage point increase in the yield spreads. Also, although 
the coefficient is not significant, the point estimate suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in 
the terms-of-trade outside the union is associated with a 0.046 percentage point decrease in the 
yield spreads. The explanatory power for volatility of terms-of-trade outside the union is 
substantial, even controlling for both regional and global factors. 
2. Literature Review 
Since Mundell’s (1961) seminal paper on the Theory of Optimum Currency Area, studies on 
the sustainability of currency unions have mostly been theoretical. Many of these studies argue the 
benefits that currency unions have as attractive sources of revenue for countries (Rose, 2000; Rose, 
2008; Rose and Engel, 2000). Rose and Stanley (2005) found an increase of between 30% and 
90% in trade between union members. The reduced cost of trade within the currency union, both 
in terms of exchange rates and reduced trade barriers, have in effect increased export trade for 
countries within the currency union (Rose and Engel, 2000). The reduced cost of trade has 
effectively reduced both welfare costs and dead weight losses, resulting in higher economic 
welfare for all trading parties within the union. Reduction in costs and increases in trade increase 
the depth of integration of both real and financial markets of union members. Recent studies on 
economic integration and currency unions have found that members of currency unions have more 
integrated business cycles than countries with their own currencies (Engel and Rose, 2000). Engel 
and Rose (2000) also found that currency union members have more trade and less volatility in 
real exchange rates than countries with their own currencies.  
Other studies argue that increased integration of real and financial markets increases systematic 





respond to such an asymmetric shock to the union serves as a critical aspect of the viability of the 
union itself. Smaller and poorer countries reap the benefit from the currency of a strong “anchor” 
country in exchange for monetary policy control; therefore, when weaker member countries fail, 
it is up to anchor countries to bail them out (Rose, 2008). Accordingly, the job of the “anchor” 
country is twofold; first, as a central bank for union members along with the union as a whole, and 
second, as a regulator. 
In Mundell’s (1961) Theory of Optimum Currency Area he gives two simple models of two 
entities – A and B. In the first of the two models, both entities initially have full employment and 
are in equilibrium in terms of balance-of-payments.  When demand shifts from goods of entity B 
to the goods of A, this distorts this equilibrium; resulting in unemployment in B and inflationary 
pressure in A. This shift allows prices in A to rise and the terms-of-trade (the change in the price 
of the country’s exports relative to its imports) to shift, relieving B of some of the burden of the 
adjustment. Mundell’s model notes that if A tightens credit restrictions to prevent this rise in prices, 
then B needs to reduce real income. But if B cannot lower prices, and A refuses to raise prices, 
then the change in terms-of-trade must be accomplished by a decline in B’s output and a rise in 
unemployment.  
In Mundell’s second model he offers two entities in different regions that share the same 
currency. The objective is to achieve full-employment for both regions. Again, when demand shifts 
from goods of entity B to the goods of A this distorts this equilibrium, resulting in unemployment 
in B and both inflationary pressure in A and a surplus in A’s balance-of-payments. In order to 
offset the increase in unemployment in B, B increases the money supply. Since the regions share 
the same currency, the increase in the money supply increases inflationary pressures in A. Central 





increasing inflationary pressures in the entire multiregional economy. These two simple models 
advocate the validity of a currency area (currency union) with a single central bank. Mundell 
(1961) argued that to relieve inflationary pressures then unemployed labor must be able to move 
freely between the two regions. Labor mobility decreases nominal rigidities and thus reduces 
business cycles (Mundell, 1961). 
The Eurozone is made up of member states that share the same currency but are regulated by 
a single central bank (European Central Bank – aka ECB). Eurozone countries have limited 
monetary policy powers; they have the ability to issue their own debt, but do not have power to 
print money (money creation). If trade is constrained to be within the Eurozone, then inflation 
differentials are relaxed, but a balance-of-payments issue can still arise. If countries have a 
balance-of-payments deficit, and are unable to refinance this deficit by printing money, then the 
country must use its own reserves to make up for the difference or use debt to finance the 
difference. The use of a country’s reserves to make up for the difference puts pressure on the 
country to meet its debt obligations and therefore leads to default.  
Countries inside the Eurozone have the ability to trade outside the union, therefore the union 
as a whole can be seen as one country trading with countries of other currencies. If demand shifts 
from the Union to another country then this will cause unemployment in the Union, and 
inflationary pressures in the other country.  The union can expand the money supply in order to 
adjust prices and reduce unemployment, but must do so by taking into account the amount of 
reserves present to sterilize the currency. The underlying assumption here is that the amount of 
reserves used to expand the money supply must come from all union members, based on the 





The following two situations illustrate a problem that may arise from not having reserves to 
offset the balance-of-payments issue starting with the simple model:  when the price level for 
country ‘A’ increases, products in country ‘B’ becomes more attractive to country ‘A’, which leads 
to an increase in exports from country ‘B’ to country ‘A’. Country ‘B’ exports to country ‘A’ for 
currency ‘A’ – accumulating currency ‘A’- thereby, increasing the supply of currency ‘A’ in the 
reserves of country ‘B’. This accumulation of currency ‘A’ in the reserves of country ‘B’ reverses 
the appreciation of the currency of country ‘A’ with respect to the currency of country ‘B’ and the 
appreciation of currency ‘A’ begins. The benefit that country ‘B’ has over country ‘A’ in the initial 
stage is that, with a depreciated currency, products from country ‘B’ become more attractive to 
country ‘A’, which produces growth in productivity, employment, and tax revenue. 
Modifying this situation a bit by having ‘B’ and ‘C’ in a currency union and ‘A’ as a country 
outside the union with its own currency: Country ‘B’ trades with both country ‘C’ and country 
‘A’, but country ‘C’ only trades with country ‘B’. As business-cycle between country ‘A’ and the 
union (comprising ‘B’ and ‘C’) shifts the demand from the union (really from country ‘B’) to 
country ‘A’, unemployment rises in ‘B’ which leads to a lowering of real income to ‘B’ , thus a 
reduction in imports from ‘C’. At this point, ‘B’ has the ability to exchange reserve currency for 
its own currency thereby sterilizing an increase in the money supply reversing demand and kick 
starting employment. However, since country ‘C’ has no reserves, it must wait for country ‘B’ to 
regain employment to begin exporting to ‘B’ again. The real danger for country ‘C’ is not having 
money to meet its debt obligations, in turn, this risk results in an increase in debt yields. 
Countries that are trading exclusively in a currency union such as the Eurozone trade goods 
for the same currency within the union and therefore do not benefit from having increased trade 





within its currency union (meaning that it solely trades between countries inside the union) but 
other union member’s trade outside the autarky, when the union currency appreciates, exports from 
the union will decrease - increasing unemployment. If the countries in the union are able to issue 
their own debt, then countries that have traded outside the union can use their reserves from the 
countries that they were trading with to exchange back at a higher rate, increasing government 
spending, spurring economic activity, and decreasing unemployment. However, countries that did 
not trade outside the currency union have no reserves and no means to spur economic activity. 
The importance of terms-of-trade is captured in the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler (HLM) effect; 
which found that when terms-of-trade worsen, net exports and savings decline because a fall in the 
purchasing power of exports. Meaning that, a terms-of-trade deterioration will cause a decrease 
in savings due to the decrease in real income, leading to a deterioration of the Current Account 
(Harberger, 1950; Laursen and Metzler, 1950). Critics of the HLM effect cite that this effect holds 
under conditions of perfect capital mobility and that it is time dependent - valid only during shocks 
for a short period (Obstfeld, 1982; Sachs, 1981; Svensson and Razin, 1983).  
Mendoza (1995) and Mendoza (1997) extends the HLM effect by finding that the volatility of 
exports relative to imports (volatility of terms-of-trade) plays an important role in welfare costs of 
macroeconomic uncertainty, and that there exists a pro-cyclical response to terms-of-trade changes 
in the real exchange rates as well as real interest rate differentials. Moreover, volatility of terms-
of-trade is generally reduced by flexible exchange rates.  
These findings indicate that with flexible exchange rates, a deterioration in terms-of-trade leads 
to a decrease in real income, which in turn will lead to lower purchasing power. A decrease in 





a currency union, nominal rigidities increase and therefore in order for the market to reach 
equilibrium, a change in production must take place. 
The change in production because of increased nominal rigidities can be looked at as a shift in 
labor, or labor mobility, as pointed out in Mundell (1961). If production cannot change, and labor 
is not mobile, then exchange rates must adjust. In terms of countries within the Eurozone, trading 
with countries outside the zone will benefit from this change in exchange rates. Therefore, an 
increase in the change of terms-of-trade will serve to increase the Current Account, thereby 
increasing the balance-of-payments. An increase in balance-of-payments, increases a countries 
reserves (assuming a net exporter); thereby increasing its ability to meet it debt obligations, 
resulting in lower debt yields. However, an increase in the volatility of terms-of-trade will increase 
welfare costs of macroeconomic uncertainty and therefore make the country more risky (increasing 
debt yields).  
This chapter focuses on differentiating between trade that is made intra-union and trade that is 
made extra-union. As discussed in Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010), it is expected that the terms-of-
trade would be a determinant in explaining the ability for a country to generate outside currency 
to sterilize it’s debt obligations. However, if countries are allowed to trade intra-union, as in this 
case through the Euro, the continued increase of imports of non-euro denominated assets (i.e. trade 
extra-union) would jeopardize the ability for the country to sterilize its debt obligations – all else 
equal. Investors, in particular bondholders, care as much about the shock in this terms-of-trade 
(volatility of terms-of-trade) as they do the actual terms-of-trade itself. Investors care that the risk 
of an adverse shock, represented by the volatility of terms-of-trade, might affect the terms-of-trade 
in the future. As so, this chapter hypothesizes that in the case of a currency union, macroeconomic 





extra-union terms-of-trade) would have a significant impact on the terms of trade. Therefore, an 
increase in the volatility in the extra-union terms-of-trade will increase sovereign debt yield 
spreads. 
This chapter hypothesizes the following:  
 
H1: An increase in the terms-of-trade outside the union will decrease debt yield spreads. 
H2: An increase in the volatility of terms-of-trade outside the union will increase debt yield 
spreads. 
Ferreira and Gama (2007) look at the cross-country stock market reaction to Standard & Poor’s 
announcements of downgrade or change in sovereign credit ratings. They found that spillover 
effects of a ratings change exists both in the direction of the downgrade and in terms of economic 
impact. However no significant impact has been detected in rating upgrades. They also found that 
the negative effect of downgrades is more pronounced in traded-goods and small industry. They 
also found that the spillover impact is inversely related to geographic distance. Countries that are 
further away from the downgraded country have a greater impact. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that information asymmetry is moderated, in essence you know how your neighbor is 
doing. 
Brooks et al. (2004) found that in line with previous findings, upgrade of sovereign debt does 
not show significant behavior of abnormal returns. However, they found that in line with previous 
findings, rating downgrades do reveal a significant impact. One key finding of the research is that 
“downgrade impacts negatively on both the domestic stock market and the dollar value of the 
country’s currency” (p. 233). Hooper et al. (2008) found that “the overall impact of sovereign 
rating changes on U.S. dollar denominated national stock market returns and volatility is highly 





Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) found that rating agencies’ change in country ratings affects 
both bonds and stock markets, “with average yield spreads increasing 2 percentage points and 
average stock returns declining about 1 percentage point in response to a domestic downgrade” (p. 
190). Rating changes have a spillover effect in stock returns and bond yields in emerging markets, 
where they are strongest at the regional level.  Ratings changes are amplified for nontransparent 
countries. The researchers also found a strong correlation between upgrades/downgrades of 
countries, where “domestic-country rating upgrades do take place following market rallies, 
whereas downgrades occur after market downturns.” The research also finds that interest rate hikes 
in the U.S. affect “fragile” economies more (p. 190). 
3. Methodology 
This chapter extends the model of Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) by taking two key 
macroeconomic fundamental variables (terms-of-trade, and volatility of terms-of-trade) and 
differentiating between trade intra-union and extra-union. The model will therefore be the 
following regression: Equation 13 
 
Equation 13: Model for Estimating Yield Spreads 
Model for Estimating Yield Spread. 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑉𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑉𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔∆𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒












The global and regional variables included in the regression model (equation 13) are chosen 
based on studies discussing the importance of these factors on yield spreads: (Beirne and 
Fratzscher, 2013; Cantor and Packer, 1996; Hauner et al., 2010; Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010; 
Pagano and Sedunov, 2013). Aggregate systemic exposure of financial institutions are positively 
related to sovereign debt default risk, therefore these factors are included in the model (Pagano 
and Sedunov, 2013). 
The HML effect holds under conditions of both perfect capital mobility and during shocks. 
Currency unions increase capital mobility and a financial crisis can be considered a business cycle 
shock, therefore, a financial crisis in a currency union would come close to satisfying HML 
conditions. Therefore, a quantile regression of the data is preformed to see if the independent 
variable significance still holds for the regression. If the regression coefficients do not vary across 
quantiles, then an OLS regression would suffice, but if coefficients vary across quantiles 
(especially in the upper quantiles – during shocks) a logged form OLS should be utilized.  
Since the quantile regression graphs on Figure 1 shows that in high quantile intervals (at and 
above the .95 quantile) we obtain significantly different results that are outside the OLS confidence 
intervals, therefore a logged form OLS will be utilized. The result of the quantile graphs were 
robust, and thus signals that the relationship holds for extreme values (achieved during a shock). 
The results from the quantile regressions hold interesting results. During a time of shock, with 
extremely high yield spreads (yield spreads at and above 5.945 and up to 30.788), the 0.95 quantile 
yielded the greatest results.  
4. Data 
The data used in this paper are sourced from Euromonitor International’s Global Market 






Figure 1: Estimated Parameters by Quantile for All Variables at the 95% Confidence Limits. 
 
time periods in which data were available. The countries used in the analysis included the 
following Eurozone countries: Austria, Italy, France, Belgium, Ireland, Greece, Slovenia, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Netherlands, Germany, Finland, and Spain. The time period for the data was 
from September 2001 to December 2012 (11 years - 4months) for a total of 136 months – 
sampled monthly. To control for global factors and global regional factors, variables considered 
by Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) will be included: the regional factors include Debt-to-GDP, 
Reserves-to-GDP, and the German 10yr YTM. The global factors include the S&P 500 implied 
volatility index (VIX), and the TED (which is defined as the spread between the U.S. 3-month 

























































































































































































































































Table 4. The descriptive statistics of these variables are included in Table 23. 
The correlation matrix of the variables are included in Table 22. The regressions are based on 
monthly data, and all variables are gathered and analyzed accordingly except for the debt-to-
GDP variable. Since outstanding sovereign debt is only available quarterly, variables will be 
converted to monthly observations by copying the revealed quarter number for the next two 
months until the new quarterly number is revealed by their respective countries. For example, if 
total outstanding debt for Austria is 4 billion for the first quarter of 2003, 4 billion will be used 
for the January, February, and March number, until the new number quarterly number is revealed 
in April. This method of generating monthly debt numbers is applied because debt is proprietary 
per country, meaning that only each sovereign country has sole control over its’ total debt. Also, 
there exists no known study that measures or estimates the total amount of outstanding monthly 
sovereign debt for the countries selected; therefore, monthly debt amounts cannot be calculated. 
Further, debt cannot be anticipated (expected). Several studies discuss market reaction and 
responses to treasury debt announcements, signaling a correlation between market responses to 
increases and decreases of government debt (especially increase/decreases of ‘cash management 
bills’ – bills of six months or less) as revealed by the governments themselves (Emekter, 2004; 
Schirm et al., 1989). 
5. Results 
The purpose of this study was to see if an increase in the terms-of-trade outside the union will 
decrease debt yields, and to see if an increase in the volatility of terms-of-trade outside the union 
will increase debt yields. Accordingly, this study filtered and categorized terms-of-trade and 
volatility of terms-of-trade into in to two distinct categories – inside and outside of the currency 






Table 4: Description of Variables 
Description of Variables. 
 
Variables Variable Definitions 
Yield Spreads The difference between the debt yields of a given country and 
the yields of benchmark country Germany on debt with 
comparable maturity. 
VTOTInside Volatility of Terms-of-Trade Inside the Union: the standard 
deviation of the percentage change in terms of the price of the 
country’s exports relative to its imports over the previous five 
months to and from countries inside the currency union. 
VTOTOutside Volatility of Terms-of-Trade Outside the Union: the standard 
deviation of the percentage change in terms of the price of the 
country’s exports relative to its imports over the previous five 
months to and from countries outside the currency union. 
DTOTInside Change in Terms-of-Trade inside the Union: the percentage 
change in the price of the country’s exports relative to its 
imports over the past five months to and from countries inside 
the currency union.  
DTOTOutside Change in Terms-of-Trade outside the Union: the percentage 
change in the price of the country’s exports relative to its 
imports over the past five months to and from countries outside 
the currency union. 
German Yield German 10-Year Yield 
VIX Global VIX index 
TED The difference between the three-month LIBOR and the three-
month U.S. T-Bill interest rate. 
Debt/GDP Control Variable: % Debt to GDP 
Reserves/GDP Control Variable: Reserves (Including Gold) to GDP 
S&P Credit Rating Credit Rating Dummy Variables, based on S&P 
 
 








 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Log Yield Spread Log Yield Spread 
   
Log ∆TOTInside 0.0368 0.0395 
 (0.0355) (0.0361) 
Log ∆TOTOutside -0.0270 -0.0461 
 (0.0401) (0.0416) 
Log VTOTInside 0.151 0.128 
 (0.103) (0.107) 
Log VTOTOutside 0.202* 0.238* 
 (0.115) (0.131) 
Log GermanYield -1.955*** -2.111*** 
 (0.127) (0.136) 
Log Debt-to-GDP  0.0460 
  (0.159) 
Log Reserves-to-GDP  -0.144*** 
  (0.0432) 
Log TED 0.0303 0.0345 
 (0.0628) (0.0647) 
Log VIX Global 1.592*** 1.532*** 
 (0.115) (0.120) 
Log S&P Credit Rating 1.130*** 1.079*** 
 (0.0587) (0.0823) 
Constant -5.225*** -7.428*** 
 (0.446) (1.004) 
   
Observations 432 417 
R-squared 0.791 0.799 




Included with the variables of interest, which are terms-of-trade outside the union and volatility 
of terms-of-trade outside the union, were a set of regional and global control variables that are 
identified in previous studies as important in explaining debt yield spreads. Considering the results 
in Table 5 Column 1, not controlling for Debt-to-GDP and Reserves-to-GDP, a 1 percent increase 
in the volatility of terms-of-trade outside the union is associated with a 0.20 percent increase in 
debt yield spreads. It was also found that a 1 percent increase in terms-of-trade outside the union 





not significant). The main regression result in Table 5 Column 2 indicates that volatility of terms-
of-trade outside the currency union has a positive overall effect on debt yields, a 1 percent increase 
in the volatility of terms-of-trade outside the union is associated with a 0.23 percent increase in 
debt yield spreads. This finding is in line with H2 and indicates that the volatility of terms-of-trade 
of countries within the union to countries outside the union increases the welfare cost of 
macroeconomic uncertainty thereby increasing debt yield spreads. The increase in the volatility of 
terms-of-trade increases balance-of-payments uncertainty thereby increasing debt yield spreads. 
An increase in the balance-of-payments uncertainty will certainly bring the control variables Debt-
to-GDP and Reserves-to-GDP into play as these variables are directly related to a balance-of-
payments crisis, therefore, we perform the regression with and without these variables to see if we 
do control for them do they change the significance and terms of the volatility of terms-of-trade 
(column 1). In fact it is found that a 1 percent increase in the reserves-to-GDP of countries inside 
the currency union is associated with a 0.144 percentage point decrease in the yield spreads. 
Looking at two main models, we can see that even when controlling for a highly significant 
Reserves-to-GDP, the explanatory power of volatility of terms-of-traded holds and becomes even 
more significant. 
The results also indicate that, although the explanatory power of this variable is not significant, 
a 1 percent increase in the terms-of-trade outside the union is associated with a 0.04 percent 
decrease in debt yield spreads. Although the explanatory power of this variable is not significant, 
this finding is in line with the direction in which H1 hypothesizes that an increase in the terms-of-
trade of countries within the union to countries outside the union decreases debt yield spreads. An 





in the regression from Column 1 to Column 2, the explanatory powers on terms-of-trade outside 
the union and the volatility of terms-of-trade outside the union became even stronger.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence that for countries within currency unions, trading outside of the 
union decreases asymmetrical shocks in business cycles (between countries in the union and other 
countries); thereby increasing the risk of default. In particular, this paper shows that within a 
currency union, the change in the volatility of terms-of-trade both inside and outside the currency 
union effects debt prices for countries within the union. This paper finds that a 1 percentage point 
increase in the volatility of terms-of-trade outside the union are associated with a 0.23 percentage 
point increase in the yield spreads. Also, although the coefficient is not significant, the point 
estimate suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in the terms-of-trade outside the union is 
associated with a 0.046 percentage point decrease in the yield spreads. The explanatory power for 
volatility of terms-of-trade outside the union is substantial, even controlling for both regional and 
global factors. This finding is in line with the findings of previous studies (Cordella and Yeyati, 
2003; Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010; Obstfeld, 1982; Sachs, 1981; Svensson and Razin, 1983). 
The findings in this paper have important implications for both policymakers and investors. 
The reduction in transaction costs that currency union members benefit from might be more of a 
trap than a blessing. This paper finds that as currency union members reap the benefits of increased 
economic integration and trade between other members, this increase in trade reduces reserves, 
and increases the likelihood of default. In fact it is found that a 1 percent increase in the reserves-
to-GDP of countries inside the currency union is associated with a 0.144 percentage point decrease 
in the yield spreads. Although currency unions function to increase co-movements in prices as well 





If some countries in the union have greater trade outside the union than others, then during 
times of asymmetric shock (between the union as a whole and other countries), production (in 
terms of labor mobility) should be able to shift to these countries to counter this shock. This shift 
in labor mobility reduces nominal rigidities, and as noted in Mundell (1961): “if labor and capital 
are insufficiently mobile within a country [union], then flexibility of the external price of the 









The formation of the European Union as a currency union posed several challenges to policy 
makers. Union members gave up the sovereignty of their currency for exchange of enjoying higher 
trade and lower unemployment. However, during times of crisis the loss of sovereignty of their 
currency put in jeopardy the country and the union as a whole. This dissertation intended to do two 
things: Chapter 2) It intended to answer the question of whether the ECB was able to abate the 
moral hazard when performing a bailout, and Chapter 3) It intended to find whether more trade 
outside the union than within the union reduced macroeconomic risk by means of reduced debt 
yield spreads. This dissertation provides the first comprehensive evidence regarding the central 
bank bailout operation effectiveness under the umbrella of a currency union. This dissertation also 
provides the first evidence regarding the degree to which trade performed outside the currency 
union unions influences debt yield spreads.    
Chapter 2 examined whether the ECB, in performing bailouts individually, was able to abate 
the moral hazard. This form of bailout was a unique, novel in approach, and had no precedence. 
The objective of this was to reduce or eliminate the moral hazard involved in performing bailouts 
which in turn reduced the costs associated with bailouts. This chapter finds that the ECB was 
generally able to abate the moral hazard when performing this bailout. It finds that the voting 
mechanism, as stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty, aided the ECB in abating the moral hazard. 
Chapter 3 examined whether it mattered that union members were trading more outside the 
union or within the union. The chapter hypothesized that when union members traded more outside 
the union, this cushioned them (in terms of reduced debt yield spreads) when in the union as a 





join unions the reduction in transaction costs of trade within the union leads to higher and higher 
trade within the union, and lower trade outside the union. In fact this chapter finds this contention 
to be true; as member countries trade less within the union, and as the risk of this trade increases, 
debt yield spreads also increase. There exists no study that differentiates trade in this manner in 
trying to find whether trade influences debt yields in currency unions.  
1. Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
Although the contributions of this dissertation are significant and important to policy makers 
and investors, it is important to note that the evolution of the currency unions in terms of changing 
policies and the restructuring of rules and regulations may have indirect effects on the variables 
used in this study. Even though union members have trade agreements stipulated between them in 
the EU, member countries may also have trade agreements with other countries outside of the 
union. This study does not account for trade agreements with countries outside of the union.  
In the context of ECB bailouts, this dissertation suggests that future research in this area should 
try to focus on the effectiveness of bailouts of firms with systemic ties to the ECB will influence 
bailout outcomes. Further research might be directed towards a deposit insurance for banks within 
the EU, similar to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the United States, overseen 
by the ECB to regulate banking in the EU.  
In the context of trade within the EU, this dissertations suggests that future research in this area 
should focus on trying to find a causal relationship between the increase in trade within the union 
and increases in debt yield spreads. Further research might be directed towards seeing how the 
addition of new EU members influences business cycles between current union members and new 







The following lemma is a mathematical interpretation of Chapter 2’s model as suggested by 
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= 1, , for all real values of 𝑥; 𝛿𝑥, 𝜇1…6 and 𝜑𝑥 are 
constants; and the function is continuous from 0 to 4𝜋, 
and, 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Raw Data 
Descriptive Statistics of Raw Data. 
 








Mean 0.000522462 0.0096741 0.000574958 0.001746573 0.000354818 
S.E. 2.65538E-06 0.000602305 2.29359E-06 4.62534E-05 1.10062E-06 
Med. 0 0 0 0 0 
Mode 0 0 0 0 0 
Std. Dev. 0.001180722 0.135285436 0.001121655 0.013107527 0.000612086 
Var. 1.3941E-06 0.018302149 1.25811E-06 0.000171807 3.74649E-07 
Kur. 1865.73495 6827.181911 880.5526741 757.8514293 2616.510502 
Skew. 29.79438672 62.09321231 17.54407396 22.273962 24.03624328 
Range 0.11 18.191 0.107 0.659 0.094 
Min. 0 0 0 0 0 
Max. 0.11 18.191 0.107 0.659 0.094 
Sum 103.299 488.068 137.507 140.262 109.738 









Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Filtered Five Minute Spot Volatility of German 10 Year Bond Yields 
 












Mean 0.00281855 0.00305268 0.00304166 0.00279166 0.00282772 0.00285037 0.00300434 0.00271304 
S.E. 3.3884E-05 0.00016697 0.00012654 0.00013351 3.5088E-05 5.2275E-05 0.00012798 0.00012047 
Med. 0.002867 0.002853 0.00275 0.00225 0.002894 0.002853 0.00275 0.00225 
Mode 0.003148 0.002971 0.00225 0.00225 0.003148 0.002971 0.00225 0.00225 
Std. Dev. 0.00037118 0.00182908 0.00138620 0.00146253 0.00037628 0.00056059 0.00137249 0.00129194 
Var. 1.3777E-07 3.3455E-06 1.9215E-06 2.1390E-06 1.4158E-07 3.1426E-07 1.8837E-06 1.6691E-06 
Kur. 2.23762683 69.4790400 2.46908227 5.05990876 2.30483674 0.09390494 2.80448542 0.62433881 
Skew -1.2372335 7.76637525 1.18064218 1.57854825 -1.3048392 0.32465441 1.23443603 0.77980702 
Range 0.001856 0.018706 0.0085 0.01 0.001856 0.002794 0.0085 0.007 
Min. 0.001391 0.001588 0.00075 0.00025 0.001391 0.001588 0.00075 0.00025 
Max. 0.003247 0.020294 0.00925 0.01025 0.003247 0.004382 0.00925 0.00725 
Sum 0.338226 0.366322 0.365 0.335 0.325188 0.327793 0.3455 0.312 







Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Filtered Five Minute Spot Volatility of Greece 10 Year Bond Yields 
 












Mean 0.03085760 0.03899919 0.04371380 0.04411939 0.02456978 0.02693512 0.04100571 0.03306660 
S.E. 0.00312921 0.00933951 0.00653744 0.00870164 0.00130935 0.00663964 0.00651306 0.00597952 
Med 0.0238135 0.0039545 0.002667 0.002333 0.023311 0.002818 0.002333 0.002333 
Mode 0.038724 0.001182 0.002333 0 0.038724 0.001182 0.002333 0 
Std. Dev. 0.03427883 0.10230920 0.07161412 0.09532176 0.01404122 0.07120223 0.06984485 0.06412329 
Var. 0.00117503 0.01046717 0.00512858 0.00908623 0.00019715 0.00506975 0.00487830 0.00411179 
Kur. 18.1601461 20.6502502 4.38316531 14.6175128 9.20126421 24.0770305 5.19447016 3.76661261 
Skew 4.02521446 4.26869743 2.06491516 3.41626010 2.16290564 4.63235842 2.20514350 2.20734912 
Range 0.233799 0.710909 0.346 0.629 0.098405 0.512364 0.346 0.26 
Min 0.002372 0 0 0 0.002372 0 0 0 
Max 0.236171 0.710909 0.346 0.629 0.100777 0.512364 0.346 0.26 
Sum 3.702913 4.679903 5.245657 5.294327 2.825525 3.097539 4.715657 3.80266 









Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of Filtered Five Minute Spot Volatility of Italy 10 Year Bond Yields 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Filtered Five Minute Spot Volatility of Italy 10 Year Bond Yields. 
 




ItaFFF5 Itanoann5 Itasameday5 Itadayafter5 
Mean 0.00464943 0.00499169 0.00477708 0.00444375 0.00439128 0.00447750 0.00463478 0.00441087 
S.E. 0.00015945 0.00035859 0.00027395 0.00023942 0.00011494 0.00016025 0.00026903 0.00024499 
Med 0.0042475 0.004397 0.00425 0.004125 0.004223 0.004382 0.004 0.004 
Mode #N/A 0.004412 0.00225 0.006 #N/A 0.004059 0.00225 0.00275 
Std. Dev. 0.00174672 0.00392825 0.00300101 0.00262271 0.00123267 0.00171855 0.00288509 0.00262728 
Var. 3.051E-06 1.543E-05 9.006E-06 6.878E-06 1.519E-06 2.953E-06 8.323E-06 6.902E-06 
Kur. 5.07512050 51.2638678 0.31375797 0.87214643 1.48288450 16.6903567 0.65421014 1.00371757 
Skew 1.83047703 6.41497426 0.89305801 0.91882587 0.59309139 2.80676141 0.94878333 0.99218162 
Range 0.010902 0.038059 0.01325 0.013 0.007265 0.014706 0.01325 0.013 
Min 0.001312 0.001265 0.0005 0.00025 0.001312 0.001265 0.0005 0.00025 
Max 0.012214 0.039324 0.01375 0.01325 0.008577 0.015971 0.01375 0.01325 
Sum 0.557932 0.599003 0.57325 0.53325 0.504998 0.514913 0.533 0.50725 









Table 10: Descriptive Statistics of Filtered Five Minute Spot Volatility of Spain 10 Year Bond Yields 
 












Mean 0.0036655 0.00375835 0.00325833 0.00328333 0.00343095 0.00350974 0.00323260 0.00316956 
S.E. 0.00013557 0.00020106 0.00022532 0.00021027 8.946E-05 0.00010745 0.00023228 0.00020378 
Med 0.0033065 0.003441 0.002625 0.002625 0.00327 0.003382 0.0025 0.0025 
Mode 0.004181 0.002706 0.002 0.00175 0.004181 0.002706 0.002 0.00175 
Std. Dev. 0.00148513 0.00220258 0.00246827 0.00230338 0.00095939 0.00115236 0.00249093 0.00218536 
Var. 2.205E-06 4.851E-06 6.092E-06 5.3056E-06 9.204E-07 1.327E-06 6.2047E-06 4.775E-06 
Kur. 7.25552140 56.4249718 15.4043825 3.77514698 2.25481719 2.03991509 15.6689081 3.50488580 
Skew 2.37914519 6.41734809 3.08894525 1.81955538 1.10037761 1.00314444 3.15454108 1.76213534 
Range 0.009096 0.022882 0.01925 0.012 0.00553 0.00703 0.01925 0.01125 
Min 0.001563 0.000794 0 0.00025 0.001563 0.000794 0 0.00025 
Max 0.010659 0.023676 0.01925 0.01225 0.007093 0.007824 0.01925 0.0115 
Sum 0.43986 0.451003 0.391 0.394 0.39456 0.403621 0.37175 0.3645 








Table 11: Descriptive Statistics of Filtered Five Minute Spot Volatility of Portugal 10 Year Bond Yields 












Mean 0.003482 0.01323989 0.00833312 0.00834085 0.003478 0.00345567 0.00349393 0.00345551 
S.E. 3.199E-06 0.00987424 0.00494212 0.00496615 2.89E-06 2.199E-05 3.719E-05 6.555E-05 
Med 0.0034825 0.003478 0.003472 0.003472 0.003482 0.00348 0.003472 0.003472 
Mode 0.003484 0.003467 0.003472 0 0.003484 0.003467 0.003472 0.003547 
Std. Dev. 3.505E-05 0.10816688 0.05413823 0.0544015 3.10E-05 0.0002358 0.00039889 0.00070304 
Var. 1.228E-09 0.01170007 0.00293094 0.0029595 9.63E-10 5.564E-08 1.591E-07 4.942E-07 
Kur. 8.6650518 119.993926 119.960160 119.935660 12.6569 21.528268 8.02741265 19.6711019 
Skew -1.708670 10.9540382 10.9517401 10.950078 -3.116098 -3.654087 1.57993634 0.81139249 
Range 0.000271 1.187751 0.596398 0.599236 0.000227 0.00203 0.002683 0.007928 
Min 0.003313 0.000509 0 0 0.003313 0.001884 0.002514 0 
Max 0.003584 1.18826 0.596398 0.599236 0.00354 0.003914 0.005197 0.007928 
Sum 0.417901 1.588787 0.999975 1.000902 0.400076 0.397402 0.401803 0.397384 









Figure 2: Spain FFF Superimposed on Spot Volatility of Days of No Announcements. 
 
 


























































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Portugal FFF Superimposed on Spot Volatility of Days of No Announcements. 
 
 























































































































































































































































































































Figure 10: Italy FFF Superimposed on Spot Volatility of Days of No Announcements. 
 
 

















































































































































Figure 12: Italy FFF Superimposed on Spot Volatility of Same Day of Announcement. 
 
 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 18: Germany FFF Superimposed on Spot Volatility of Day of No Announcements. 
 
 











































































































































Figure 20: Germany FFF Superimposed on Spot Volatility of Day After Announcement. 
 
 











































































































































Table 12: Regression Analysis of Spain 10 Year Bond Yields for both Average 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling 
Regression Analysis of Spain 10 Year Bond Yields for Both Average 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Spanoann120 Spasameday120 Spadayafter120 Spanoann5 Spasameday5 Spadayafter5 
       
SpaFFF120 1.086*** 0.616*** 0.649***    
 (0.0929) (0.142) (0.130)    
SpaFFF5    0.930*** 1.353*** 0.808*** 
    (0.0715) (0.208) (0.200) 
Constant -0.000224 0.00100* 0.000905* 0.000319 -0.00141* 0.000396 
 (0.000367) (0.000562) (0.000513) (0.000255) (0.000743) (0.000714) 
       
Observations 120 120 120 115 115 115 
R-squared 0.537 0.137 0.175 0.599 0.271 0.126 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Spanoann120 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling of a day in which no event happened. 
Spasameday120 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling of a day in which an event occurred. 
Spadayafter120 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling of the day after the day that an event occurred. 
Spanoann5 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading 
day, of a day in which no event happened. Spasameday5 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling, with 
the first five observations removed per trading day, of a day in which an event occurred. Spadayafter5 represents a dependent variable 
of the full 120 5-minute day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading day, of the day after the day that an event 
occurred. SpaFFF120 represents an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-minute 
day sampling. SpaFFF5 represents an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-minute 










Table 13: Regression Analysis of Portugal 10 Year Bond Yields for both Average 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling 
Regression Analysis of Portugal 10 Year Bond Yields for Both Average 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pornoann120 Porsameday120 Pordayafter120 Pornoann5 Porsameday5 Pordayafter5 
       
PorFFF120 814.4*** 404.7*** 406.2***    
 (274.3) (137.4) (138.1)    
PorFFF5    -1.670** 0.344 -1.828 
    (0.698) (1.210) (2.126) 
Constant -2.823*** -1.401*** -1.406*** 0.00927*** 0.00230 0.00982 
 (0.955) (0.478) (0.481) (0.00243) (0.00421) (0.00740) 
       
Observations 120 120 120 115 115 115 
R-squared 0.069 0.068 0.068 0.048 0.001 0.007 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Pornoann120 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling of a day in which no event happened. 
Porsameday120 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling of a day in which an event occurred. 
Pordayafter120 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling of the day after the day that an event occurred. 
Pornoann5 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading 
day, of a day in which no event happened. Porsameday5 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling, with 
the first five observations removed per trading day, of a day in which an event occurred. Pordayafter5 represents a dependent variable 
of the full 120 5-minute day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading day, of the day after the day that an event 
occurred. PorFFF120 represents an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-minute 
day sampling. PorFFF5 represents an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-minute 









Table 14: Regression Analysis of Italy 10 Year Bond Yields for both Average 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling 
Regression Analysis of Italy 10 Year Bond Yields for Both Average 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Itanoann120 Itasameday120 Itadayafter120 Itanoann5 Itasameday5 Itadayafter5 
       
ItaFFF120 1.688*** 0.919*** 0.530***    
 (0.137) (0.134) (0.129)    
ItaFFF5    1.097*** 1.347*** 0.912*** 
    (0.0809) (0.180) (0.181) 
Constant -0.00286*** 0.000505 0.00198*** -0.000341 -0.00128 0.000408 
 (0.000679) (0.000663) (0.000642) (0.000369) (0.000821) (0.000826) 
       
Observations 120 120 120 115 115 115 
R-squared 0.563 0.286 0.125 0.620 0.331 0.183 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Itanoann120 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling of a day in which no event happened. Itasameday120 
represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling of a day in which an event occurred. Itadayafter120 represents a 
dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling of the day after the day that an event occurred. Itanoann5 represents a 
dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading day, of a day in which 
no event happened. Itasameday5 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling, with the first five observations 
removed per trading day, of a day in which an event occurred. Itadayafter5 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day 
sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading day, of the day after the day that an event occurred. ItaFFF120 represents 
an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-minute day sampling. . ItaFFF5 represents 
an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-minute day sampling with the first five 









Table 15: Regression Analysis of Greece 10 Year Bond Yields for both Average 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling 
Regression Analysis of Greece 10 Year Bond Yields for Both Average 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Grenoann120 Gresameday120 Gredayafter120 Grenoann5 Gresameday5 Gredayafter5 
       
GreFFF120 2.248*** 0.495*** 1.898***    
 (0.181) (0.187) (0.187)    
GreFFF5    2.788*** 0.541 1.257*** 
    (0.398) (0.465) (0.413) 
Constant -0.0304*** 0.0285*** -0.0145* -0.0416*** 0.0277** 0.00219 
 (0.00832) (0.00860) (0.00861) (0.0113) (0.0131) (0.0117) 
       
Observations 120 120 120 115 115 115 
R-squared 0.567 0.056 0.466 0.302 0.012 0.076 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Grenoann120 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling of a day in which no event happened. 
Gresameday120 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling of a day in which an event occurred. 
Gredayafter120 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling of the day after the day that an event occurred. 
Grenoann5 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading 
day, of a day in which no event happened. Gresameday5 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling, with 
the first five observations removed per trading day, of a day in which an event occurred. Gredayafter5 represents a dependent variable 
of the full 120 5-minute day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading day, of the day after the day that an event 
occurred. GreFFF120 represents an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-minute 
day sampling. GreFFF5 represents an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-minute 










Table 16: Regression Analysis of German 10 Year Bond Yields for both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling 
Regression Analysis of Germany 10 Year Bond Yields for Both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Gernoann120 Gersameday120 Gerdayafter120 Gernoann5 Gersameday5 Gerdayafter5 
       
GerFFF120 0.420 0.537 0.503    
 (0.452) (0.340) (0.360)    
GerFFF5    0.872*** 0.630* 0.674** 
    (0.114) (0.338) (0.317) 
Constant 0.00187 0.00153 0.00137 0.000383 0.00122 0.000808 
 (0.00128) (0.000967) (0.00102) (0.000324) (0.000964) (0.000903) 
       
Observations 120 120 120 115 115 115 
R-squared 0.007 0.021 0.016 0.343 0.030 0.039 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Gernoann120 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling of a day in which no event happened. 
Gersameday120 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling of a day in which an event occurred. 
Gerdayafter120 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling of the day after the day that an event occurred. 
Gernoann5 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading 
day, of a day in which no event happened. Gersameday5 represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-minute day sampling, with 
the first five observations removed per trading day, of a day in which an event occurred. Gerdayafter5 represents a dependent variable 
of the full 120 5-minute day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading day, of the day after the day that an event 
occurred. GerFFF120 represents an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-minute 
day sampling. . GerFFF5 represents an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-










Table 17: Regression Analysis of Spain 10 Year Bond Yields for both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling 
Regression Analysis of Spain 10 Year Bond Yields for Both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Spanoann120L Spasameday120L Spadayafter120L Spanoann5L Spasameday5L Spadayafter5L 
       
Spafffna120L 1.086***      
 (0.0567)      
Spafffsd120L  0.616***     
  (0.150)     
Spafffda120L   0.649***    
   (0.127)    
Spafffna5L    0.951***   
    (0.0589)   
Spafffsd5L     1.420***  
     (0.190)  
Spafffda5L      0.994*** 
      (0.157) 
Constant -0.000224 0.00100* 0.000905* 0.000227 -0.00167** -0.000261 
 (0.000224) (0.000594) (0.000502) (0.000215) (0.000690) (0.000572) 
       
Observations 4,080 480 480 3,910 460 460 
R-squared 0.083 0.034 0.052 0.063 0.109 0.080 











Regression Analysis of Spain 10 Year Bond Yields for Both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling. Continued. 
Spanoann120L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling of a day in which no event happened. 
Spasameday120L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling of a day in which an event occurred. 
Spadayafter120L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling of the day after the day that an event occurred. 
Spanoann5L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading 
day, of a day in which no event happened. Spasameday5L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling, with the 
first five observations removed per trading day, of a day in which an event occurred. Spadayafter5L represents a dependent variable of 
the full 120 5-min day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading day, of the day after the day that an event occurred. 
SpaFFFna120L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the no-event set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling. 
SpaFFFsd120L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the same-day set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day 
sampling. SpaFFFda120L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the day-after set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min 
day sampling. SpaFFFna5L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-
min day sampling with the first five observations removed per trading day with the first five observations removed per trading day. 
SpaFFFsd5L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling 
with the first five observations removed per trading day with the first five observations removed per trading day. SpaFFFda5L represents 
an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling with the first five 









Table 18: Regression Analysis of Portugal 10 Year Bond Yields for both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling 
Regression Analysis of Portugal 10 Year Bond Yields for Both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pornoann120L Porsameday120L Pordayafter120L Pornoann5L Porsameday5L Pordayafter5L 
       
Porfffna120L 814.4***      
 (65.54)      
Porfffsd120L  404.7***     
  (68.27)     
Porfffda120L   406.2***    
   (68.62)    
Porfffna5L    -1.670***   
    (0.513)   
Porfffsd5L     0.344  
     (1.589)  
Porfffda5L      -1.828 
      (1.805) 
Constant -2.823*** -1.401*** -1.406*** 0.00927*** 0.00230 0.00982 
 (0.228) (0.238) (0.239) (0.00178) (0.00553) (0.00628) 
       
Observations 3,960 480 480 3,795 460 460 
R-squared 0.038 0.068 0.068 0.003 0.000 0.002 










Regression Analysis of Portugal 10 Year Bond Yields for Both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling. Continued. 
Pornoann120L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling of a day in which no event happened. 
Porsameday120L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling of a day in which an event occurred. 
Pordayafter120L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling of the day after the day that an event occurred. 
Pornoann5L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading 
day, of a day in which no event happened. Porsameday5L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling, with the 
first five observations removed per trading day, of a day in which an event occurred. Pordayafter5L represents a dependent variable of 
the full 120 5-min day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading day, of the day after the day that an event occurred. 
PorFFFna120L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the no-event set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling. 
PorFFFsd120L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the same-day set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day 
sampling. PorFFFda120L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the day-after set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min 
day sampling. PorFFFna5L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-
min day sampling with the first five observations removed per trading day with the first five observations removed per trading day. 
PorFFFsd5L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling 
with the first five observations removed per trading day with the first five observations removed per trading day. PorFFFda5L represents 
an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling with the first five 









Table 19: Regression Analysis of Italy 10 Year Bond Yields for both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling 
Regression Analysis of Italy 10 Year Bond Yields for Both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Itanoann120L Itasameday120L Itadayafter120L Itanoann5L Itasameday5L Itadayafter5L 
       
Itafffna120L 1.688***      
 (0.0647)      
Itafffsd120L  0.919***     
  (0.140)     
Itafffda120L   0.530***    
   (0.127)    
Itafffna5L    1.097***   
    (0.0714)   
Itafffsd5L     1.347***  
     (0.198)  
Itafffda5L      0.912*** 
      (0.180) 
Constant -0.00286*** 0.000505 0.00198*** -0.000341 
 
-0.00128 0.000408 
 (0.000321) (0.000694) (0.000630) (0.000326) (0.000903) (0.000823) 
       
Observations 4,080 480 480 3,910 460 460 
R-squared 0.143 0.083 0.035 0.057 0.092 0.053 










Regression Analysis of Italy 10 Year Bond Yields for Both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling. Continued. 
Itanoann120L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling of a day in which no event happened. Itasameday120L 
represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling of a day in which an event occurred. Itadayafter120L represents a 
dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling of the day after the day that an event occurred. Itanoann5L represents a dependent 
variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading day, of a day in which no event 
happened. Itasameday5L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling, with the first five observations removed 
per trading day, of a day in which an event occurred. Itadayafter5L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling, 
with the first five observations removed per trading day, of the day after the day that an event occurred. ItaFFFna120L represents an 
independent variable of the FFF of the no-event set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling. ItaFFFsd120L represents 
an independent variable of the FFF of the same-day set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling. ItaFFFda120L represents 
an independent variable of the FFF of the day-after set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling. ItaFFFna5L represents 
an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling with the first five 
observations removed per trading day with the first five observations removed per trading day. ItaFFFsd5L represents an independent 
variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling with the first five observations removed 
per trading day with the first five observations removed per trading day. ItaFFFda5L represents an independent variable of the FFF of 











Table 20: Regression Analysis of Greece 10 Year Bond Yields for both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling 
Regression Analysis of Greece 10 Year Bond Yields for Both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Grenoann120L Gresameday120L Gredayafter120L Grenoann5L Gresameday5L Gredayafter5L 
       
Greffna120L 2.248***      
 (0.173)      
Greffsd120L  0.495**     
  (0.197)     
Greffda120L   1.898***    
   (0.199)    
Grefffna5L    2.788***   
    (0.392)   
Grefffsd5L     0.541  
     (0.485)  
Grefffda5L      1.257*** 
      (0.425) 
Constant -0.0304*** 0.0285*** -0.0145 -0.0416*** 0.0277** 0.00219 
 (0.00795) (0.00908) (0.00915) (0.0111) (0.0137) (0.0120) 
       
Observations 1,320 360 360 1,265 345 345 
R-squared 0.114 0.017 0.203 0.039 0.004 0.025 












Regression Analysis of Greece 10 Year Bond Yields for Both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling. Continued. 
Grenoann120L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling of a day in which no event happened. 
Gresameday120L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling of a day in which an event occurred. 
Gredayafter120L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling of the day after the day that an event occurred. 
Grenoann5L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading 
day, of a day in which no event happened. Gresameday5L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling, with the 
first five observations removed per trading day, of a day in which an event occurred. Gredayafter5L represents a dependent variable of 
the full 120 5-min day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading day, of the day after the day that an event occurred. 
GreFFna120L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the no-event set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling. 
GreFFsd120L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the same-day set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling. 
GreFFda120L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the day-after set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling. 
GreFFFna5L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling 
with the first five observations removed per trading day with the first five observations removed per trading day. GreFFFsd5L represents 
an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling with the first five 
observations removed per trading day with the first five observations removed per trading day. GreFFFda5L represents an independent 
variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling with the first five observations removed 











Table 21: Regression Analysis of Germany 10 Year Bond Yields for both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling 
Regression Analysis of Germany 10 Year Bond Yields for Both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Gernoann120L Gersameday120L Gerdayafter120L Gernoann5L Gersameday5L Gerdayafter5L 
       
Gerfffna120L 0.420***      
 (0.162)      
Gerfffsd120L  0.537*     
  (0.309)     
Gerfffda120L   0.503    
   (0.342)    
Gerfffna5L    0.872***   
    (0.105)   
Gerfffsd5L     0.630**  
     (0.307)  
Gerfffda5L      0.674** 
      (0.305) 
Constant 0.00187*** 0.00153* 0.00137 0.000383 0.00122 0.000808 
 (0.000461) (0.000879) (0.000973) (0.000299) (0.000874) (0.000871) 
       
Observations 4,080 480 480 3,910 460 460 
R-squared 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.017 0.009 0.011 












Regression Analysis of Germany 10 Year Bond Yields for Both 120 and 115 5-Minute Day Sampling. Continued. 
Gernoann120L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling of a day in which no event happened. 
Gersameday120L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling of a day in which an event occurred. 
Gerdayafter120L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling of the day after the day that an event occurred. 
Gernoann5L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading 
day, of a day in which no event happened. Gersameday5L represents a dependent variable of the full 120 5-min day sampling, with the 
first five observations removed per trading day, of a day in which an event occurred. Gerdayafter5L represents a dependent variable of 
the full 120 5-min day sampling, with the first five observations removed per trading day, of the day after the day that an event occurred. 
GerFFFna120L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the no-event set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling. 
GerFFFsd120L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the same-day set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day 
sampling. GerFFFda120L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the day-after set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min 
day sampling. GerFFFna5L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-
min day sampling with the first five observations removed per trading day with the first five observations removed per trading day. 
GerFFFsd5L represents an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling 
with the first five observations removed per trading day with the first five observations removed per trading day. GerFFFda5L represents 
an independent variable of the FFF of the entire data set conditional on time for the full 120 5-min day sampling with the first five 













Table 22: Correlation Matrix for Panel Estimation 
 
Correlation Matrix for Panel Estimation.  
*all variables are logged 
 
Table 23: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics. 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Yield Spread 1245 1.192677 3.085853 -.146 30.788 
∆TOTInside 1632 .4784481 2.183326 -8.734268 11.77831 
∆TOTOutside 1632 .4763828 2.273662 -8.090908 16.26221 
VTOTInside 1632 8.368425 4.542263 1.950584 29.14229 
VTOTOutside 1632 8.728934 4.281804 1.921574 27.45594 
GermanYield 1632 3.526706 .935587 1.199 5.255 
Debt-to-GDP 1632 67.74828 30.7315 22 170.3 
Reserves-to-GDP 1459 8.29e-08 5.06e-08 9.35e-12 2.94e-07 
TED 1632 .4608066 .4817686 .123 3.1481 
VIX Global 1632 21.62007 9.004677 10.42 59.89 
S&P Credit Rating 1632 3.487745 3.260389 1 23 
 ∆TOTIn ∆TOTOut VTOTIn VTOTOut GermanYld Debt/GDP Reserves/GDP VIX TED S&P 
∆TOTIn 1          
∆TOTOut -0.1317 1         
VTOTIn -0.2973 0.0617 1        
VTOTOut 0.0308 -0.3226 -0.4921 1       
GermanYield -0.0115 -0.0454 -0.0586 -0.0437 1      
Debt/GDP 0.0402 0.1042 -0.2164 0.4025 -0.0388 1     
Reserves/GDP 0.0497 0.127 0.0442 -0.0587 0.3189 -0.016 1    
VIX 0.0225 -0.0652 0.0358 -0.024 0.047 0.110 0.03 1   
TED -0.1033 -0.0056 0.0361 -0.14 0.1029 -0.115 0.1258 -0.297 1  
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